Epistemic Rights, Moral Rights, and The Abuse of Perceived Epistemic Authority

Notizie di Politeia 149:122-126 (2023)
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Abstract

This contribution discusses two aspects of Watson’s account of epistemic rights: namely, the nature of epistemic rights, and a particular form of epistemic rights violation that Watson calls the abuse of perceived epistemic authority. It is argued that Watson’s take on both aspects is unsatisfactory, and some suggestions for an alternative view are offered.

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Michel Croce
Università degli Studi di Genova

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On What it Takes to be an Expert.Michel Croce - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):1-21.

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