How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547-579 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief‐forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach’s work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief‐forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought, and address objections to it. We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological debates.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,932

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?David Enoch & Joshua Schechter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.
Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology.Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):505-533.
Epistemological externalism and the project of traditional epistemology.Adam Leite - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):505–533.
Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification.Mikayla Kelley - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):671-688.
Social Routes to Belief and Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - The Monist 84 (3):346-367.
Transglobal Reliabilism.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):171-195.
Evidence.Michael Tooley - 2019 - In Graham Oppy (ed.), A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Hoboken: Blackwell. pp. 303–322.
The Justification of a Priori Intuitions.Paul Tidman - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):161-171.
Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):362-377.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-07

Downloads
31 (#504,102)

6 months
14 (#253,070)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references