The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic

Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464 (2010)
Abstract
We think of logic as objective. We also think that we are reliable about logic. These views jointly generate a puzzle: How is it that we are reliable about logic? How is it that our logical beliefs match an objective domain of logical fact? This is an instance of a more general challenge to explain our reliability about a priori domains. In this paper, I argue that the nature of this challenge has not been properly understood. I explicate the challenge both in general and for the particular case of logic. I also argue that two seemingly attractive responses – appealing to a faculty of rational insight or to the nature of concept possession – are incapable of answering the challenge.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00199.x
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Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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