Abstract
In this commentary, I highlight the relevance of Cushman's target article for the popular dual-process framework of thinking. I point to the problematic characterization of rationalization in traditional dual-process models and suggest that in line with recent advances, Cushman's rational rationalization account offers a way out of the rationalization paradox.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x19002048
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References found in this work BETA

Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.

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Citations of this work BETA

Machine Thinking, Fast and Slow.Jean-François Bonnefon & Iyad Rahwan - 2020 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24 (12):1019-1027.

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