Dilemma for Saulish Skepticism: Either Self-Defeating or Not Even Skepticism

Disputatio (48):43-55 (2018)

Authors
Samuel Director
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul faces a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not yield a skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; thus, her argument fails.
Keywords Skepicism  Implicit Bias  Saul  Self-Defeat
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DOI 10.2478/disp-2018-0001
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References found in this work BETA

Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Scepticism and Implicit Bias.Jennifer Saul - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):243-263.

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