Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589 (2013)
An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary value.
|Keywords||Intuition Philosophical methodology Justification Skepticism Self-defeating arguments|
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References found in this work BETA
Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry.Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) - 1998 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
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