Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589 (2013)
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Abstract

An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary value.

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Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne

Citations of this work

Intuition.Joel Pust - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Carving Intuition at its Joints.Jason Schukraft - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):326-352.
Breaking Out of the Circle.Caravello John - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (1):25-35.

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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Realism, Mathematics, and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.

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