Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589 (2013)
Abstract
An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary value.
Keywords Intuition  Philosophical methodology  Justification  Skepticism  Self-defeating arguments
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9870-2
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.

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