In what sense is knowledge the Norm of assertion?

Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59 (2008)

Authors
Pascal Engel
School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences
Abstract
The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all the criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect. It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to me, however, that a number of these criticisms are based on a number of misunderstandings of the notion of a norm and of the way it can regulated a given practice. Once we spell out in what sense knowledge can play a normative role in this context, the KAA appears much more plausible.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1163/18756735-90000843
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,692
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
``Must We Know What We Say?&Quot.Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.
Truth and Assertion: Rules Vs Aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Epistemic Separabilism.Kenneth Boyd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1907-1927.
Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
Unsafe Assertions.Martijn Blaauw & Jeroen de Ridder - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):1-5.
Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.
What Assertion Doesn't Show.Conor McHugh - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):407-429.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
195 ( #32,918 of 2,327,780 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #428,974 of 2,327,780 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature