Irksome assertions

Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128 (2013)
Abstract
The Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) says that knowledge is the norm of assertion: you may assert a proposition only if you know that it’s true. The primary support for KAA is an explanatory inference from a broad range of linguistic data. The more data that KAA well explains, the stronger the case for it, and the more difficult it is for the competition to keep pace. In this paper we critically assess a purported new linguistic datum, which, it has been argued, KAA well explains. We argue that KAA does not well explain it
Keywords Assertion  Norms  Knowledge account  Matthew Benton
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0028-z
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References found in this work BETA
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

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Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.

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