Problems with the appeal to intuition in epistemology

Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141 (2008)
Authors
Adam Feltz
Michigan Technological University
Abstract
George Bealer argues that intuitions are not only reliable indicators of truth, they are necessary to the philosophical endeavor. Specifically, he thinks that intuitions are essential sources of evidence for epistemic justification. I argue that Bealer's defense of intuitions either (1) is insufficient to show that actual human beings are in a position to use intuitions for epistemic justification, or (2) begs the question. The growing empirical data about our intuitions support the view that humans are not creatures appropriately positioned to use intuitions for epistemic justification in the way Bealer suggests. Without the appropriate empirical evidence that humans are beings so positioned, his view begs the question against those who think that intuitions are not reliable guides to truth.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790802015650
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References found in this work BETA

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.René Descartes - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
On Trying to Save the Simple View.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.

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