Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):209-222 (2012)

Jeremy Fischer
Independent Scholar
Much of the philosophical attention directed to pride focuses on the normative puzzle of determining how pride can be both a central vice and a central virtue. But there is another puzzle, a descriptive puzzle, of determining how the emotion of pride and the character trait of pride relate to each other. A solution is offered to the descriptive puzzle that builds upon the accounts of Hume and Gabriele Taylor, but avoids the pitfalls of those accounts. In particular, the emotion and the trait correspond to two employments of personal ideals: personal ideals as standards of self-assessment and personal ideals as practical guides in one’s deliberation and related activities. This account, in turn, provides a framework for solving the normative puzzle
Keywords pride  emotion  character  moral psychology  Gabriele Taylor  shame  contempt  virtue  vice  Socrates
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-012-9337-x
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References found in this work BETA

Servility and Self-Respect.Jr Thomas E. Hill - 1973 - The Monist 57 (1):87 - 104.
Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life.Nancy Sherman - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):589-613.
Modesty, Snobbery, and Pride.Nicholas Dixon - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3-4):415-429.
Pride and Identity.Jerome Neu - 1998 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):227-248.

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Citations of this work BETA

Pride, Achievement, and Purpose.Antti Kauppinen - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Pride. London: Rowman and Littlefield.
Personal Ideals as Metaphors.Nick Riggle - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):265-283.

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