This book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics together, in a way that remains faithful to the texts and responsive to debates in contemporary ethics. Recent moral philosophy has seen a revival of interest in the concept of virtue, and with it a reassessment of the role of virtue in the work of Aristotle and Kant. This book brings that re-assessment to a new level of sophistication. Nancy Sherman argues that Kant preserves a (...) notion of virtue in his moral theory that bears recognisable traces of the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions, and that his complex anthropology of morals brings him into surprising alliance with Aristotle. She develops her argument through close readings of major texts by both Aristotle and Kant, illustrating points of congruence and contrast. (shrink)
Most traditional accounts of Aristotle's theory of ethical education neglect its cognitive aspects. This book asserts that, in Aristotle's view, excellence of character comprises both the sentiments and practical reason. Sherman focuses particularly on four aspects of practical reason as they relate to character: moral perception, choicemaking, collaboration, and the development of those capacities in moral education. Throughout the book, she is sensitive to contemporary moral debates, and indicates the extent to which Aristotle's account of practical reason provides an alternative (...) to theories of impartial reason. (shrink)
While few soldiers may have read the works of Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius, it is undoubtedly true that the ancient philosophy known as Stoicism guides the actions of many in the military. Soldiers and seamen learn early in their training "to suck it up," to endure, to put aside their feelings and to get on with the mission. Stoic Warriors is the first book to delve deeply into the ancient legacy of this relationship, exploring what the Stoic philosophy actually is, (...) the role it plays in the character of the military (both ancient and modern), and its powerful value as a philosophy of life. Marshalling anecdotes from military history--ranging from ancient Greek wars to World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq--Nancy Sherman illuminates the military mind and uses it as a window on the virtues of the Stoic philosophy, which are far richer and more interesting than our popularized notions. Sherman--a respected philosopher who taught at the US Naval Academy--explores the deep, lasting value that Stoicism can yield, in issues of military leadership and character; in the Stoic conception of anger and its control (does a warrior need anger to go to battle?); and in Stoic thinking about fear and resilience, grief and mourning, and the value of camaraderie and brotherhood. Sherman concludes by recommending a moderate Stoicism, where the task for the individual, both civilian and military, youth and adult, is to temper control with forgiveness, and warrior drive and achievement with humility and humor. Here then is a perceptive investigation of what makes Stoicism so compelling not only as a guiding principle for the military, but as a philosophy for anyone facing the hardships of life. (shrink)
IN THIS PAPER I CONSIDER THE VALUE OF FRIENDSHIP FROM AN ARISTOTELIAN POINT OF VIEW. THE ISSUE IS OF CURRENT INTEREST GIVEN RECENT CHALLENGES TO IMPARTIALIST ETHICS TO TAKE MORE SERIOUSLY THE COMMITMENTS AND ATTACHMENTS OF A PERSON. HOWEVER, I ENTER THAT DEBATE IN ONLY A RESTRICTED WAY BY STRENGTHENING THE CHALLENGE ARTICULATED IN ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEMATIC DEFENSE OF FRIENDSHIP AND THE SHARED LIFE. AFTER SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, I BEGIN BY CONSIDERING ARISTOTLE'S NOTION THAT GOOD LIVING OR HAPPINESS ("EUDAIMONIA") FOR AN (...) INDIVIDUAL NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE HAPPINESS OF OTHERS. SHARED HAPPINESS ENTAILS THE RATIONAL CAPACITY FOR JOINTLY PROMOTING COMMON ENDS AS WELL AS THE CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY WITH AND COORDINATE SEPARATE ENDS. THIS EXTENDED NOTION OF HAPPINESS PRESUPPOSES THE EXTENSION OF SELF THROUGH ATTACHMENTS, AND I NEXT CONSIDER CERTAIN MINIMAL CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR ATTACHMENT. FINALLY, I DISCUSS HOW ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF A FRIEND AS "ANOTHER SELF" IS COMPATIBLE BOTH WITH A CONCEPTION OF THE SEPARATENESS OF THE INDIVIDUALS AND OF THE DISTINCTIVE WAYS IN WHICH EACH INDIVIDUAL REALIZES VIRTUE WITHIN A SHARED LIFE. (shrink)
In this paper I explore the role of manners and morals. In particular, what is the connection between emotional demeanor and the inner stuff of virtue? Does the fact that we can pose faces and hide our inner sentiments, i.e., 'fake it,' detract from or add to our capacity for virtue? I argue, following a line from the Stoics, that it can add to our virtue and that, as a result, moral education needs to take seriously both a commitment to (...) good character and a commitment to the 'aesthetic' of character. (shrink)
We often hold people morally responsible for their emotions. We praise individuals for their compassion, think less of them for their ingratitude or hatred, reproach self-righteousness and unjust anger. In the cases I have in mind, the ascriptions of responsibility are not simply for offensive behaviors or actions which may accompany the emotions, but for the emotions themselves as motives or states of mind. We praise and blame people for what they feel and not just for how they act. In (...) cases where people may subtly mask their hatred or ingratitude through more kindly actions, we still may find fault with the attitude we see leaking through the disguise. (shrink)
Drawing on in-depth interviews with service women and men, Nancy Sherman weaves narrative with a philosophical and psychological analysis of the moral and emotional attitudes at the heart of the afterwars. Afterwar offers no easy answers for reintegration. It insists that we widen the scope of veteran outreach to engaged, one-on-one relationships with veterans.
One of the reasons often cited for the renewed interest in Aristotelian virtue theory is its alleged sensitivity to the particular case. In addition to rules and procedures is attention to the variety of individual cases, and a reminder of the shortfalls of misplaced rigour. Often quoted are the passages from the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle warns that we must seek only so much precision as is appropriate for the subject matter. Repeated, too, is the well-known phrase of the (...) Ethics, that “judgment rests in perception”. The spirit of these remarks, in essence, that “practical wisdom is not scientific understanding”, is contrasted with modern views which stress the sufficiency of algorithms for fully determining right action and deliberation based on deduction from rules. (shrink)
The ethics of Aristotle , and virtue ethics in general, have enjoyed a resurgence of interest over the past few decades. Aristotelian themes, with such issues as the importance of friendship and emotions in a good life, the role of moral perception in wise choice, the nature of happiness and its constitution, moral education and habituation, are finding an important place in contemporary moral debates. Taken together, the essays in this volume provide a close analysis of central arguments in Aristotle's (...) Nicomachean Ethics and show the enduring interest of the questions Aristotle raises. (shrink)
When we think about Kantian virtue, what often comes to mind is the notion of respect. Respect is due to all persons merely in virtue of their status as rational agents. Indeed, on the Kantian view, specific virtues, such as duties of beneficence, gratitude, or self-perfection, are so many ways of respecting persons as free rational agents. To preserve and promote rational agency, to protect individuals from threats against rational agency, i.e., to respect persons, is at the core of virtue. (...) No doubt, part of the appeal of the Kantian notion of respect is that it offers an intuitive way of talking about the wrongness of manipulation and coercion, and in general, the wrongness of unfairly taking advantage of another. For to respect persons is to take seriously their status as persons, and to forswear, at some level, actions and attitudes that would compromise their dignity. Talking about respect has become shorthand for signaling deontological concerns. More formally, within recent Kantian exegesis, respect is viewed as yielding a more accessible and less contrived account of the Categorical Imperative than the more traditional criterion of universalizability and the contradictions tests applied to it. Within the Kantianinspired political theory of John Rawls, respect is also a core notion, representing a pervasive good, the bases of which, just states have an obligation to distribute to their members. Yet, for all its appeal, respect is an odd feature of Kantian ethics. For it is an emotion in a theory that prides itself in grounding morality in principles of reason alone. In this essay, I draw attention to the importance of respect in Kant's account in order to show just how he makes room for the emotions. Indeed, I shall argue that on Kant's account of full moral agency, we are emotional as well as rational creatures. Although Kant often portrays respect as an abstract emotional attitude mysteriously connected to our rationality, I argue that on a suitable revision, respect can be transformed into a more concrete attitude, cultivated and expressed alongside other emotions requisite for full virtue. (shrink)
Sherman presents a slightly revised definition of empathy, in which empathy is the cognitive ability to place oneself in the world of another, imagining all of the realities, feelings, and circumstances of that person in the context of their world.
Upheavals of Thought is Martha Nussbaum’s most recent, sweeping and masterful study of the human life lived through the emotions. The book’s scope is expansive by any measurement, covering in the first part an historical and contemporary analysis of emotions, their sociality, developmental features, and cultivation; and in the second and third parts an in depth analysis of the specific emotions of compassion and love respectively, with chapter length discussions on love that take up Augustine, Dante, Mahler, Brontë, Whitman, Joyce (...) among others, and discussions on compassion that move through ancient philosophical and literary authors to contemporary discussions of justice and the construction of adequate measurements of the quality of life. (shrink)
This chapter draws upon ancient sources to develop a cognitivist account of emotions and indicate the sense in which they are candidates for the attribution of moral responsibility. Aristotle and the Stoics provide rich resources here, even if the Stoics themselves ultimately deny a place for ordinary emotions in the best moral life. In a selective engagement with the ancients, Kant aligns himself with the Stoic disparagement of the emotions while rejecting their cognitivist account. According to him, emotions are inclinations (...) distinct from the exercise of practical reason. But in his later moral writings, Kant urges a place for emotions in the fine and virtuous character. The chapter begins by reviewing considered intuitions about the moral significance of emotions. (shrink)
TWO OBJECTIONS are often levelled against Aristotle's theory of practical inference. The first is that he fails to discuss adequately the nature of reasoning about the ends of good living. Thus, while there is no shortage of examples of technical deliberation, such as how a doctor deliberates to bring about healing, we have no comparable examples of how a person of determinate character deliberates to promote the ends of that character. The second is that while Aristotle has an account of (...) how we reason to a decision to act now, he lacks a more general account of intention that can accommodate both present intention and future intention--that is, intending now to act later. The two challenges, I want to argue, are related, though often not by the objectors. Deliberation about how best to live over the course of a life requires a continuing interest in one's future self and a capacity to decide upon future ends that constrain the present and are constrained by it. An Aristotelian conception of the good life, with its intrinsic sense of completeness and unity, requires this close knit of present and future. But if this is so, then the capacity to deliberate about the future and to regulate the present in light of future plans will be particularly urgent in the case of living such a life. Deliberation about future intentions should, if anywhere, play a prominent role here. It will be a severe limitation on Aristotle's view if his account of deliberation precludes such a role for practical reason. (shrink)
Jonathan Lear in Radical Hope tackles the idea of cultural devastation, in the specific case of the Crow Indians. What do we mean by “annihilation” of a culture? The moral point of view that he imagines as he reconstructs the eve and aftermath of this annihilation is not second personal, of obligation, but first personal, in the collective and singular, as told by the Crows, with Lear as “analyst.” Radical Hope is a study of representative character of a people—of virtue, (...) courage, resilience, and hope in the face of cultural collapse. The leading questions are shaped by ancient Greek ethics, but with a twist: On the brink of cultural death , what counts for us as good living and what is the nature of the virtues or excellences that constitute it? How might a leader, a phronimos , exemplify it? This puts it too narrowly. The questions, also, are Wittgensteinian: How does a nation go on, when the concepts and way of life it has lived by for centuries are no more? What does it mean to go on? What does it mean to stop when the marks of going on are no longer? (shrink)
Chapter I: The background to Aristotle's theory is provided by Aristophanes' Clouds in the debate between the traditionalists and Socratics on moral education. Aristotle steers a middle course between the old and new educations, preserving on the one hand, the role of filial ties in the transmission of values, and on the other, the importance of practical reason in providing a critical assessment of attachments. ;Chapter II: Here I argue against a common reading of Aristotle that views moral training as (...) merely a matter of habituation and practice whereby certain skills become second-nature. I propose instead that moral training is a training of "right pleasures and pains", or attachments to certain ends and objects of value. These I argue are transmitted through antecedent attachments to family. ;Chapter III: A theory of the development of character requires an analysis of emotions and desires constitutive of character. Aristotle regards emotions as intentional, where by intentional he means directed at certain objects regarded by an agent selectively, as the result of certain beliefs, perceptions, and phantasia. Thus, emotions have desiderative and cognitive elements, and training is directed at each. ;Chapter IV: Another aspect of moral training is paideia through music and tragedy. Both ensure for the transmission of a common core of cultural values, and thus extend training beyond the family to the city. At the heart of this paideia is the notion of mimesis. In music, mimesis is a process is one of association, whereby the pleasurable quality of music reinforces an attachment to the characters which music expresses. In tragedy, the identification is more complex. Katharsis through pity and fear requires that we identify not merely with characters, but with choice and actions and deliberations which lead to them. ;Chapter V: I conclude by studying Aeschylus' Oresteia as a tragedy which illustrates the notion of identification, as well as Aristotle's general belief that moral training takes place within the family. Through tragedy we see the complexities that develop within philia, and are forced, through pity and fear, to examine our own filial sentiments and obligations. (shrink)
Jonathan Lear in "Radical Hope" tackles the idea of cultural devastation, in the specific case of the Crow Indians. What do we mean by "annihilation" of a culture? The moral point of view that he imagines as he reconstructs the eve and aftermath of this annihilation is not second personal, of obligation, but first personal, in the collective and singular, as told by the Crows, with Lear as "analyst." "Radical Hope" is a study of representative character of a people—of virtue, (...) courage, resilience, and hope in the face of cultural collapse. The leading questions are shaped by ancient Greek ethics, but with a twist: On the brink of cultural death, what counts for us as good living and what is the nature of the virtues or excellences that constitute it? How might a leader, a phronimos, exemplify it? This puts it too narrowly. The questions, also, are Wittgensteinian: How does a nation go on, when the concepts and way of life it has lived by for centuries are no more? What does it mean to go on? What does it mean to stop when the marks of going on are no longer? (shrink)
Julia Annas has written a monumental work that is in the best sense of the word, a “conversation” with ancient theories of morality. Indeed what we have in the Morality of Happiness is a sustained conversation with the various ancient schools on the nature of eudaimonia and the moral dimensions of the best life for humans. This is a work that takes the Hellenists seriously, and as such, gives us both a fresh way of assessing Aristotle in terms of the (...) refinements that were to come later, as well as insights about the Hellenist foundation of many of our modern formulations. But the trajectory into modern morality is not Annas’ primary aim. On the whole, for the duration of this book, we are immersed in the debate between the various schools themselves and in the richness of their own dialogue. To be sure, there are lessons to be learned for ourselves and our own way of doing moral theory. But these stand out primarily from the contrasts. So for example, Plato’s Protagoras aside, Annas argues that notions of maximization and algorithmic procedures for arriving at right action are not to be found in ancient theory. A “problem-solving mechanism” for hard cases is simply not the ancient preoccupation, despite the fact that conflicts abound in the ancient world no less than in the modern era. (shrink)
Upheavals of Thought is Martha Nussbaum’s most recent, sweeping and masterful study of the human life lived through the emotions. The book’s scope is expansive by any measurement, covering in the first part an historical and contemporary analysis of emotions, their sociality, developmental features, and cultivation; and in the second and third parts an in depth analysis of the specific emotions of compassion and love respectively, with chapter length discussions on love that take up Augustine, Dante, Mahler, Brontë, Whitman, Joyce (...) among others, and discussions on compassion that move through ancient philosophical and literary authors to contemporary discussions of justice and the construction of adequate measurements of the quality of life. (shrink)
In what ways, if any, is Stoic equanimity a plausible armor for enduring torture? I believe that we can learn something about stoic equanimity in general by examining this especially hard case. It turns out that a broadly Stoic view still leaves a torture victim vulnerable to being forced to use one’s agency against oneself. In this sense, even the best Stoic armor has its limits.
On October 25, 1946, three weeks after the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg entered its verdicts, the United States established Military Tribunal I for the trial of twenty-three Nazi physicians. The charges, delivered by Brigadier General Telford Taylor on December 9, 1946, form a seminal chapter in the history of medical ethics and, specifically, medical ethics in war. The list of noxious experiments conducted on civilians and prisons of war, and condemned by the Tribunal as war crimes and as crimes (...) against humanity, is by now more or less familiar. That list included: high-altitude experiments; freezing experiments; malaria experiments; sulfanilamide experiments; bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration and bone transplantation experiments; sea water experiments; jaundice and spotted fever experiments; sterilization experiments; experiments with poison and with incendiary bombs. What remains less familiar is the moral mindset of doctors and health care workers who plied their medical skill for morally questionable uses in war. In his 1981 work, The Nazi Doctors, Robert Jay Lifton took up that question, interviewing doctors, many of whom for forty years continued to distance themselves psychologically from their deeds. The questions about moral distancing Lifton raised have immediate urgency for us now. Military medical doctors, psychiatrists and psychologists serve in U.S. military prisons in Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, Kandahar, and, until very recently, in undisclosed CIA operated facilities around the world where medical ethics are again at issue. Moreover, they serve in top positions in the Pentagon, as civilian and military heads of command, who pass orders and regulations to military doctors in the field, and who are in charge of the health of enemy combatants, as well as U.S. soldiers. Because we recently marked the sixtieth anniversary of the judgment at Nuremberg, I want to awaken our collective memory to the ways in which doctors in war, even in a war very different from the one the Nazis fought, can insulate themselves from their moral and professional consciences. (shrink)
