Enactive neuroscience, the direct perception hypothesis, and the socially extended mind

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38:e75 (2015)
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Abstract

Pessoa'sThe Cognitive-Emotional Brain(2013) is an integrative approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and emotion, which enactivism unifies in its foundational concept of sense-making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of mental processes is not reducible to specific brain regions and neuroanatomical connectivity. An enactive neuroscience is emerging.

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Tom Froese
Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University