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Profile: Giovanna Colombetti (University of Exeter)
  1.  42
    The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind.Giovanna Colombetti - 2013 - MIT Press.
  2. Extending the Extended Mind: The Case for Extended Affectivity.Giovanna Colombetti & Tom Roberts - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1243-1263.
    The thesis of the extended mind (ExM) holds that the material underpinnings of an individual’s mental states and processes need not be restricted to those contained within biological boundaries: when conditions are right, material artefacts can be incorporated by the thinking subject in such a way as to become a component of her extended mind. Up to this point, the focus of this approach has been on phenomena of a distinctively cognitive nature, such as states of dispositional belief, and processes (...)
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  3. Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind.Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1157-1176.
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines, and develop phenomenological (...)
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  4. Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion.Giovanna Colombetti - 2013 - In S. J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
    The theory of autopoiesis is central to the enactive approach. Recent works emphasize that the theory of autopoiesis is a theory of sense-making in living systems, i.e. of how living systems produce and consume meaning. In this chapter I first illustrate (some aspects of) these recent works, and interpret their notion of sense-making as a bodily cognitive- emotional form of understanding. Then I turn to modern emotion science, and I illustrate its tendency to over-intellectualize our capacity to evaluate and understand. (...)
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  5. The Feeling Body: Towards an Enactive Approach to Emotion.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - forthcoming - In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved (...)
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  6.  36
    Enactive Affectivity, Extended.Giovanna Colombetti - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    In this paper I advance an enactive view of affectivity that does not imply that affectivity must stop at the boundaries of the organism. I first review the enactive notion of “sense-making”, and argue that it entails that cognition is inherently affective. Then I review the proposal, advanced by Di Paolo, that the enactive approach allows living systems to “extend”. Drawing out the implications of this proposal, I argue that, if enactivism allows living systems to extend, then it must also (...)
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  7. Enactive Appraisal.Giovanna Colombetti - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):527-546.
    Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.” I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective notion of personhood.
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  8.  80
    Emotion and Ethics: An Inter-(En)Active Approach. [REVIEW]Giovanna Colombetti & Steve Torrance - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):505-526.
    In this paper, we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:485–507, 2007 ) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective inter-connectedness, as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ has for ethical theory itself.
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  9. Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience.Giovanna Colombetti - 2011 - Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...)
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  10.  85
    Appraising Valence.Giovanna Colombetti - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
    ‘Valence’ is used in many different ways in emotion theory. It generally refers to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of an emotion, as well as to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of some aspect of emotion. After reviewing these different uses, I point to the conceptual problems that come with them. In particular, I dis- tinguish: problems that arise from conflating the valence of an emotion with the valence of its aspects, and problems that arise from the very idea that (...)
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  11. Enacting Emotional Interpretations with Feeling.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):200-201.
    This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains a complex microdevelopment of affect. (3) Neurophenomenology is a promising research program for testing Lewis's hypotheses about the neurodynamics of emotion-appraisal amalgams.
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  12. From Affect Programs to Dynamical Discrete Emotions.Giovanna Colombetti - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):407-425.
    According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions. This paper discusses some of these criticisms, and argues that they do not undermine the claim that emotions are discrete. This paper also presents some works in dynamical affective science, and argues that to conceive of discrete emotions as self-organizing and softly assembled patterns of various processes accounts more (...)
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  13.  70
    The Somatic Marker Hypotheses, and What the Iowa Gambling Task Does and Does Not Show.Giovanna Colombetti - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):51-71.
    Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is a prominent neuroscientific hypothesis about the mechanisms implementing decision-making. This paper argues that, since its inception, the SMH has not been clearly formulated. It is possible to identify at least two different hypotheses, which make different predictions: SMH-G, which claims that somatic states generally implement preferences and are needed to make a decision; and SMH-S, which specifically claims that somatic states assist decision-making by anticipating the long-term outcomes of available options. This paper also argues (...)
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  14.  53
    Bodily Feeling in Depersonalization: A Phenomenological Account.Giovanna Colombetti & Matthew Ratcliffe - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):145-150.
    This paper addresses the phenomenology of bodily feeling in depersonalization disorder. We argue that not all bodily feelings are intentional states that have the body or part of it as their object. We distinguish three broad categories of bodily feeling: noematic feeling, noetic feeling, and existential feeling. Then we show how an appreciation of the differences between them can contribute to an understanding of the depersonalization experience.
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  15.  29
    What Language Does to Feelings.Giovanna Colombetti - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):4-26.
    This paper distinguishes various ways in which language can act on our affect or emotion experience. From the commonsensical consideration that sometimes we use language merely to report or describe our feelings, I move on to discuss how language can constitute, clarify, and enhance them, as well as induce novel and oft surprising experiences. I also consider the social impact of putting feelings into words, including the reciprocal influences between emotion experience and the public dissemination of emotion labels and descriptions, (...)
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  16.  36
    Il corpo E il vissuto affettivo: Verso un approccio «enattivo» allo studio delle emozioni.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2008 - Rivista di Estetica 48 (37):77-96.
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  17.  63
    Reply to Barrett, Gendron & Huang.Giovanna Colombetti - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):439 – 442.
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  18.  2
    The Embodied and Situated Nature of Moods.Giovanna Colombetti - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-15.
    In this paper I argue that it is misleading to regard the brain as the physical basis or “core machinery” of moods. First, empirical evidence shows that brain activity not only influences, but is in turn influenced by, physical activity taking place in other parts of the organism. It is therefore not clear why the core machinery of moods ought to be restricted to the brain. I propose, instead, that moods should be conceived as embodied, i.e., their physical basis should (...)
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  19.  4
    Complexity as a New Framework for Emotion Theories.Giovanna Colombetti - 2003 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 1 (1).
    In this paper I suggest that several problems in the study of emotion depend on a lack of adequate analytical tools, in particular on the tendency of viewing the organism as a modular and hierarchical system whose activity is mainly constituted by strictly sequential causal events. I argue that theories and models based on this view are inadequate to account for the complex reciprocal influences of the many ingredients that constitute emotions. Cognitive processes, feelings and bodily states are so subtly (...)
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  20. La neurofenomenologia esperienza, percezione, cognizione.Michel Bitbol, Carmelo Call, Massimiliano Cappuccio, Mauro Ceruti, Luisa Damiano, Giovanna Colombetti, Evan Thompson, Carlo Conni, Giuseppe Longo & Mauro Maldonato - 2008 - Rivista di Estetica 48 (37):9-168.
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  21. Emotion Experience.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (eds.) - 2005 - Imprint Academic.
    Emotion experience has failed to date to gain a central place in the study of consciousness. This special issue of the _Journal of Consciousness Studies_ presents the most recent views on the matter, with discussions of several aspects of emotion experience. Contributors from different disciplines address links between feelings, brain, body and world. What happens in the brain and in the body when we have feelings? How do feelings relate to our understanding of the world? The contributors also analyse emotion (...)
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