Abstract

In this paper, it is argued that the differences between Gettier-era epistemology and post-Gettier epistemology can be largely traced to differences in methodology. We will give a “rational reconstruction” of how we did things then, what we do now, and what considerations moved us to do things differently. In summary form, during the Gettier era the methodology of epistemology was roughly what Chisholm called “particularism” and Rawls called “the method of reflective equilibrium.” Various developments forced an abandonment of this Gettier era methodology, in favor of several new constraints on an adequate theory of knowledge. Questions about the nature of epistemic normativity, the relations between knowledge and action, the value of knowledge, and the social dimensions of knowledge, all became important for adjudicating among competing theories of knowledge. This was appropriate in that the older methodology was inadequate. The new methodology accounts for the increased richness and depth that we see in epistemology today.