Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286 (2011)

Authors
Jakob Hohwy
Monash University
Abstract
There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly between individuals and within the same individual over time. This puts pressure on the notion that introspection gives reliable access to our own phenomenology: introspective unreliability would explain the variability, while assuming that the underlying phenomenology is stable. I appeal to a body of neurocomputational, Bayesian theory and neuroimaging findings to provide an alternative explanation of the evidence: though some limited testing conditions can cause introspection to be unreliable, mostly it is our phenomenology itself that is variable. With this account of phenomenal variability, the occurrence of the surprising evidence can be explained while generally retaining introspective reliability
Keywords introspection  perceptual inference  default mode
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01418.x
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References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.

View all 36 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Self‐Evidencing Brain.Jakob Hohwy - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):259-285.
Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Into the Dark Room: A Predictive Processing Account of Major Depressive Disorder.Regina E. Fabry - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):685-704.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

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