Procedural and substantive practical rationality

In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 57--74 (2003)
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Abstract

This chapter surveys the debate between philosophers who claim that all practical rationality is procedural and philosophers who claim that some practical rationality is substantive.

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Brad Hooker
University of Reading

Citations of this work

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Aggregating moral preferences.Matthew D. Adler - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):283-321.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1969 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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