On a recent objection to Popper and Miller's "disproof" of probabilistic induction

Philosophy of Science 56 (4):675-680 (1989)
Dunn and Hellman's objection to Popper and Miller's alleged disproof of inductive probability is considered and rejected. Dunn and Hellman base their objection on a decomposition of the incremental support P(h/e)-P(h) of h by e dual to that of Popper and Miller, and argue, dually to Popper and Miller, to a conclusion contrary to the latters' that all support is deductive in character. I contend that Dunn and Hellman's dualizing argument fails because the elements of their decomposition are not supports of parts of h. I conclude by reinforcing a different line of criticism of Popper and Miller due to Redhead
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DOI 10.1086/289520
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