Philosophy of Science 56 (4):675-680 (1989)

Colin Howson
London School of Economics
Dunn and Hellman's objection to Popper and Miller's alleged disproof of inductive probability is considered and rejected. Dunn and Hellman base their objection on a decomposition of the incremental support P(h/e)-P(h) of h by e dual to that of Popper and Miller, and argue, dually to Popper and Miller, to a conclusion contrary to the latters' that all support is deductive in character. I contend that Dunn and Hellman's dualizing argument fails because the elements of their decomposition are not supports of parts of h. I conclude by reinforcing a different line of criticism of Popper and Miller due to Redhead
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DOI 10.1086/289520
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