In defense of modest probabilism

Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55 (2010)
Authors
Mark Kaplan
Indiana University, Bloomington
Abstract
Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i) to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged counterexample to Modest Probabilism meant to offer proof that Modest Probabilism is no better than its orthodox predecessor at avoiding unwarranted precision
Keywords Orthodox Probabilism  Modest Probabilism  Warrant  Evidence  Decision theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9483-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,373
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 2016 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Structure of Radical Probabilism.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.
Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism.Patrick Maher - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):73-81.
Special Relativity and the Flow of Time.D. Dieks - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (3):456-460.
What Are Degrees of Belief?Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Compatible?Nicholas Maxwell - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):640-645.
On Probabilism and Induction.John Hosack - 1991 - Topoi 10 (2):227-229.
Probabilism and Beyond.Maria Carla Galavotti - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):253 - 265.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-03-16

Total downloads
87 ( #71,430 of 2,266,851 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #210,530 of 2,266,851 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature