Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety

Noûs 45 (1):77-102 (2011)
Abstract
Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind
Keywords naive realism  self knowledge  privileged access  safety  perception  epistemology
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00805.x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.

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