About this topic
Summary It turns out that there are a number of further issues that arise, when considering content externalism and knowledge of one's own mind.
Key works Some papers in this category present lesser known incompatibilist arguments, as in Goldberg 2000 and Ebbs 2003. Others explore alternate ways that content externalism might preclude introspective knowledge of other sorts of mental states. For instance, Bernecker 1996 argues that externalism limits such knowledge regarding the attitude (e.g., believing, hoping, wishing, etc.) one takes toward a content. Levine 2003 explores a problem in knowing introspectively about one's own qualia, under the assumption that qualia have anti-individualistic contents. Finally, Chase 2001 and Pritchard & Kallestrup 2004 argue that externalism precludes internalism about justification or knowledge, based on the perceived limits of the externalist's introspective self-knowledge. Brown 2007 is also an important discussion of this issue.
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  1. The transparency of mental vehicles.Michael Murez - 2023 - Noûs:1-28.
    Modes of presentation (MOPs) are often said to have to be transparent, usually in the sense that thinkers can know solely via introspection whether or not they are deploying the same one. While there has been much discussion of threats to transparency stemming from externalism, another threat to transparency has gar- nered less attention. This novel threat arises if MOPs are robust, as I argue they should be according to internalist views of MOPs which identify them with represen- tational vehicles, (...)
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  2. Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation.Ali Hossein Khani - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):153-184.
    Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the “Externalist Explanation”. I will (...)
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  3. Review of The Brain in a Vat, Edited by S. Goldberg. [REVIEW]Cameron Boult - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):75-82.
  4. Subjective Externalism.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (1):4-22.
    In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theory is committed are not. It is this realization that opens up the conceptual (...)
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  5. Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind: An Essay in Neo-Sellarsian Philosophy.T. Parent - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
    _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...)
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  6. Debating Self-Knowledge, by Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. ix + 233, £62. [REVIEW]Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):204-204.
  7. Internalism, Externalism, and Accessibilism.Brie Gertler - 2015 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119-141.
    Feldman and Conee (2001) observed that the term “internalism”, as used in epistemology, is ambiguous. It sometimes denotes the view that justification supervenes on factors within the thinker (“mentalism”), whereas at other times it refers to the view that justification is accessible to the thinker (“accessibilism”). As used in the debate about mental content, “internalism” corresponds to mentalism. Strikingly, however, it is the question of accessibilism that is the target of many internalist and externalist arguments. In this paper I argue (...)
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  8. Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism Part II: A Further Reply to Aikin and Dabay.Sarah Sawyer - 2015 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.
    This reply sets out an argument that demonstrates that a contrastive theory of self-knowledge is inconsistent with internalism in the philosophy of mind. It follows from my paper 'Contrastive Self-Knowledge', Social Epistemology, 2014, 28: 139-152.
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  9. Rationalizing Self-Interpretation.Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - 2015 - In Chris Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 419–447.
    A characteristic form of philosophical inquiry seeks to answer ‘what is x?’ questions. In this paper, we ask how philosophers do and should adjudicate debates about the correct answer to such questions. We argue that philosophers do and should rely on a distinctive type of pragmatic and meta-representational reasoning – a form of rationalizing self-interpretation – in answering ‘what is x?’ questions. We start by placing our methodological discussion within a broader theoretical framework. We posit a necessary connection between epistemic (...)
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  10. 5. Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Wolfgang Carl - 2014 - In The First-Person Point of View. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 121-150.
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  11. Externalism and Self-Knowledge.T. Parent - 2014 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.
    Entry on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A summary of the literature on whether externalism about thought content precludes non-empirical knowledge of one's own thoughts.
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  12. Contrastivism and anti-individualism: a response to Aikin and Dabay.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.
    In this paper I clarify my argument for the claim that contrastive self-knowledge entails anti-individualism.
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  13. Millikan and her critics.Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley.
    Millikan and Her Critics offers a unique critical discussion of Ruth Millikan's highly regarded, influential, and systematic contributions to philosophy of mind and language, philosophy of biology, epistemology, and metaphysics. These newly written contributions present discussion from some of the most important philosophers in the field today and include replies from Millikan herself.
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  14. Slow Switching and Authority of Self-Knowledge.Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht - 2012 - Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 32:443-449.
    Based on content externalism, the question of whether self-knowledge is authoritative or not has launched a real controversy in the philosophy of mind. Boghossian proposed slow switching argument in defense of incompatibility of the two views. This argument has been criticized by some philosophers through different approaches. Vahid is one of them. He claimed that Boghossian's argument appeals to some controversial assumptions without which it cannot achieve its conclusion. In this article, I criticize Vahid's response to slow switching argument and (...)
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  15. Understanding the internalism-externalism debate: What is the boundary of the thinker?Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):51-75.
    Externalism about mental content is now widely accepted. It is therefore surprising that there is no established definition of externalism. I believe that this is a symptom of an unrecognized fact: that the labels 'mental content externalism' -- and its complement 'mental content internalism' -- are profoundly ambiguous. Under each of these labels falls a hodgepodge of sometimes conflicting claims about the organism's contribution to thought contents, the nature of the self, relations between the individual and her community, and the (...)
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  16. El conocimiento de la propia mente: Donald Davidson sobre autoridad de la primera persona, externalismo y racionalidad.Marc Jiménez Rolland - 2012 - Dissertation, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas
    In this thesis, I elaborate and defend Donald Davidson's account of knowing one's own mental states that exhibit first-person authority. To that end, I place Davidson's account among others in the philosophical landscape concerning self-knowledge. Next, I examine his response to philosophical challenges that arise from mental content externalism and self-deception. Finally, I draw some insights froms Davidson's account to the broader aims of epsitemology.
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  17. Anti-individualism, self-knowledge, and epistemic possibility: further reflections on a puzzle about doubt.Gary Ebbs - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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  18. Semantic Externalism.Jesper Kallestrup - 2011 - New York: Routledge.
    Semantic externalism is the view that the meanings of referring terms, and the contents of beliefs that are expressed by those terms, are not fully determined by factors internal to the speaker but are instead bound up with the environment. The debate about semantic externalism is one of the most important but difficult topics in philosophy of mind and language, and has consequences for our understanding of the role of social institutions and the physical environment in constituting language and the (...)
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  19. Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.Matthew Kennedy - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
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  20. Externalism and the Resolution of Self-knowledge.Amir Horowitz & Hilla Jacobson - 2010 - Acta Philosophica 19 (2):339-348.
    This paper suggests a new way for defending semantic externalism from what we take to be the most serious attack against it in the context of the discussion of the a priori nature of self-knowledge. We shall argue that the resolution of our a priori knowledge of our beliefs on the assumption that their contents are externally determined is identical to the resolution that it makes sense to attribute to our knowledge of our beliefs independently of any assumption about content-determination. (...)
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  21. The subject's point of view – Katalin Farkas. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):743-747.
    Farkas’ ambitious agenda is to advance a strongly internalist account of the mental. She makes impressive strides towards achieving this goal. Along the way, she presents important new arguments on a number of topics, including: how best to understand the ‘twin’ cases used in debates about content, the alleged incompatibility of content externalism and privileged access, and the prospects for defending Frege’s claim that sense determines reference. In this review, I survey a number of her arguments and raise some questions (...)
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  22. Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge.Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
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  23. Anti‐individualism: Mind and language, knowledge and justification.Christopher S. Hill - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (2):112-123.
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  24. Transparency, Responsibility and Self-Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):143-151.
    Akeel Bilgrami has always argued that the contents of our thoughts are constitutively constrained by what we could be said to know about them. In earlier work he explained this in terms of a connection between thought and rationality, but his recent book argues that the ultimate ground for self-knowledge rests in our notion of responsibility. This paper will examine these arguments, and suggest that if Bilgrami is right about how self-knowledge is grounded, then it need not constrain our content (...)
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  25. Reply to Brueckner.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):264-269.
  26. The Subject’s Point of View.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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  27. Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?Sanford Goldberg - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (2):165-187.
    Frege’s ‘differential dubitability’ test is a test for differences in cognitive value: if one can rationally believe that p while simultaneously doubting that q, then the contents p and q amount to different ‘cognitive values’. If subject S is rational, does her simultaneous adoption of different attitudes towards p and q require that the difference between p and q(as cognitive values) be transparent to her? It is natural to think so. But I argue that, if attitude anti-individualism is true, then (...)
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  28. Social externalism and first-person authority.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.
    Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on (...)
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  29. Twin-earth externalism and concept possession.Derek Ball - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472.
    It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.
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  30. Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 767--780.
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  31. Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access.Jonathan Ellis - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.
    I argue that, if content externalism is in tension with privileged access to content, then content externalism is also in tension with privileged access to phenomenal character. Content externalists may thus have a new problem on their hands. This is not because content externalism implies externalism about phenomenal character. My argument is compatible with the conviction that, unlike some propositional content, phenomenal character is not individuated by environmental factors. Rather, the argument involves considering in tandem two ideas which have become (...)
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  32. A false dilemma for anti-individualism.Mikkel Gerken - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):329-42.
    It is often presupposed that an anti-individualist about representational mental states must choose between two accounts of no-reference cases. One option is said to be an ‘illusion of thought’ version according to which the subject in a no-reference case fails to think a first-order thought but rather has the illusion of having one. The other is a ‘descriptive’ version according to which one thinks an empty thought via a description. While this presupposition is not uncommon, it rarely surfaces in an (...)
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  33. Content externalism and the epistemic conception of the self.Brie Gertler - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  34. Anti-individualism and knowledge.Sanford Goldberg - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):515–518.
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  35. Wittgenstein's externalism: Context, self-knowledge & the past.William Child - 2006 - In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What determines content?: the internalism/externalism dispute. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press.
  36. Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New essays on semantic externalism and self-knowledge.Jacques-Paul Dubucs - 2006 - Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 59 (2):366-368.
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  37. Review of Nuccetelli, New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge". [REVIEW]Peter Murphy - 2006 - Essays in Philosophy 7 (1):11.
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  38. Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge.Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):53-64.
    Há um argumento cético clássico derivado das Meditações sobre a filosofia primeira. Este artigo oferece uma formulação contemporânea padrão do argumento, pretendendo mostrar que ninguém sabe qualquer coisa sobre o mundo extramental. A obra de Hilary Putnam na filosofia da linguagem e da mente parece fornecer uma resposta a uma versão atualizada do argumento cético cartesiano. Em sua maior parte, este artigo é dedicado a uma análise e crítica das meditações anti-céticas de Putnam. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Descartes. Putnam. Ceticismo. Cérebros em (...)
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  39. (Nonstandard) lessons of world-switching cases.Sanford Goldberg - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):93-129.
  40. Review of Jessica brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge[REVIEW]Sarah Sawyer - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (1).
    This is a review of Jessica Brown's book: Anti-Individualism and Knowledge.
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  41. Memory and Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
    Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.
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  42. We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does?Brie Gertler - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):44-47.
    Goldberg (2003) defends externalism from Boghossian's (1998) version of the "armchair knowledge" objection. I argue here that, while Goldberg's challenge blocks a different version of this objection, it does not directly block Boghossian's version. And Goldberg's approach is not promising as a response to Boghossian's version of the armchair knowledge objection.
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  43. Externalism and skepticism.John Greco - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 53.
    Part 1 argues that, despite rhetorical appearances, McDowell accepts a standard version of epistemic externalism. Moreover, epistemic externalism plays an important role in McDowell’s response to skepticism. Part 2 argues that, contra McDowell, epistemic externalism is necessary for rejecting skepticism, and content externalism is not sufficient for rejecting skepticism.
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  44. Do we know how we know our own minds yet?Pierre Jacob - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent compatibilist response by an advocate of content externalism, i.e., Fred Dretske's answer tot he incompatibilist argument, based on the model of displaced perceptual knowledge. I discuss the costs and benefits of his answer.
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  45. Do we know how we know our own minds yet?Pierre Jacob - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent compatibilist response by an advocate of content externalism, i.e., Fred Dretske's answer tot he incompatibilist argument, based on the model of displaced perceptual knowledge. I discuss the costs and benefits of his answer.
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  46. Of Ebbs's puzzle.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 427-439.
  47. Of Ebbs's puzzle.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
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  48. An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism.Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content (...)
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  49. The Externalist Challenge.Richard Schantz (ed.) - 2004 - De Gruyter.
    Thus the texts attempt to answer the fundamental questions - of whether there are meanings, and, if there are, of what they are and of the form a serious ...
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  50. Some reflections on scepticism: Reply to Stroud.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
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