Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):186-207 (2021)
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Abstract

Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge‐that is a ‘threshold concept’ or a ‘spectrum concept’. That is, whether there is a threshold distinguishing knowledge from non‐knowledge. The reconstructed model enjoys significant advantages as it enables the debate to be more balanced and philosophically interesting.

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Changsheng Lai
Shanghai JiaoTong University

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References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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