On justifying and being justified

Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253 (2004)
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We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one could entirely miss the relevance of this evidence and hold the belief as a result of wishful thinking or for some other bad reason. My topic in this paper is the notion of being justified which precludes beliefs flawed in this way. I will take the notion of something’s telling in favor of the truth of a proposition—that is, the notion of evidential support—for granted.



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Adam Leite
Indiana University, Bloomington

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References found in this work

The naturalists return.Philip Kitcher - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (1):53-114.
Contra Reliabilism.Carl Ginet - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):175-187.

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