Logos and Episteme 5 (4):445-464 (2014)

Abstract
Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief isnormative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we have no reasons to.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20145433
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,508
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
The Normativity of Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?Christopher Cowie - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1685-1702.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moore’s Paradox in Belief and Desire.John N. Williams - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.
Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.
A Moorean Paradox of Desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.
Moores Paradox, Behaupten, Urteilen.Christoph C. Pfisterer - 2008 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 37 (91):41-62.
What Moore’s Paradox Is About.Claudio De Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore’s Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
Moore's Paradox and Self-Ascribed Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):359-370.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-01-11

Total views
13 ( #682,185 of 2,330,909 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #589,142 of 2,330,909 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes