Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms

Logos and Episteme 5 (4):445-464 (2014)
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Abstract

Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief isnormative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we have no reasons to.

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Citations of this work

Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?Christopher Cowie - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1685-1702.

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References found in this work

The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
The normativity of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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