Précis zu Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account


Authors
David Löwenstein
Friedrich Schiller Universität, Jena
Abstract
This is a précis of my book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
Keywords Know-how  Competence  Skill  Gilbert Ryle  Ability  Knowledge-wh
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3196/004433018822499931
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Concepts and Action. Know-How and Beyond.David Löwenstein - forthcoming - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion. New Essays. London, Ontario, Kanada:
Regresse Und Routinen. Repliken Auf Brandt Und Jung.David Löwenstein - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):110-113.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Learning How.Ben Kotzee - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 50 (2):218-232.
Pierre Duhem’s Epistemic Aims and the Intellectual Virtue of Humility: A Reply to Ivanova.Ian James Kidd - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):185-189.
Is Sellars's Rylean Hypothesis Plausible? A Dialogue.Timm Triplett & Willem de Vries - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92:85-114.
All That Jazz: Linguistic Competence and Improvisation.Niklas Möller - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):237-250.
Précis of Causation and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1513-1516.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-03-02

Total views
109 ( #78,167 of 2,285,668 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
57 ( #15,019 of 2,285,668 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature