Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):385-400 (2010)

Authors
Berislav Marušić
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
An influential view, defended by Thomas Scanlon and others, holds that desires are almost never reasons. I seek to resist this view and show that someone who desires something does thereby have a reason to satisfy her desire. To show this, I argue, first, that the desires of some others are reasons for us and, second, that our own desires are no less reason-giving than those of others. In concluding, I emphasize that accepting my view does not commit one to a desire-based account of reasons. Desires can be simply one kind of reasons alongside many others
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01373.x
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References found in this work BETA

Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief and Difficult Action.Berislav Marušić - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12:1-30.

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