Husserl and Brentano on intentionality

This article is an attempt to expound and distinguish\nbrentano's concept of "Intentional inexistence" (found in\n'psychologie von einem empirischen standpunkt') and\nhusserl's early concept of intentionality (in 'logische\nuntersuchungen'). The main purpose is to show that\nhusserl's phenomenological views are very different from\nand far more developed than brentano's and that he rejects\nmany of his concepts and doctrines. First, brentano's\ndesignation of eight defining characteristics of mental\nphenomena, the purpose of which is to define psychology, is\noutlined. This is followed by a detailed discussion of\nhusserl's criticisms and revisions, emphasizing what\nhusserl thought was brentano's most important insight,\ni.E., That consciousness is intentional. A discussion of\nthree views of the nature of consciousness is given,\nconcluding with husserl's general criticisms that brentano\nfell victim to dualism and representationalism and that his\nconcept of the intentional nature of mind was distorted by\na commitment to naturalism, the latter being overcome only\nby husserl's own transcendental phenomenology in 'ideen'\nand later works
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2105978
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,807
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Relational Vs. Directional Conception of Intentionality.Jacek Pasniczek - 1996 - In Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska (ed.), Epistemology and History. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 373-380.
Towards a Theory of Intentionality.Aron Gurwitsch - 1970 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (3):354-367.
Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality.George Bealer - 1996 - In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's and Brentano's Accounts of Intentionality.Dermot Moran - 2000 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):39-65.
The Philosophy of Brentano.Linda L. McAlister (ed.) - 1976 - Humanities Press.
Brentano's Influence on Husserl's Early Notion of Intentionality.Peter Andras Varga - 2008 - Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai - Philosophia (1-2):29-48.
Reflections on Intentionality.Joseph Margolis - 2004 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
62 ( #93,179 of 2,214,607 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #134,247 of 2,214,607 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature