Simply, false

Analysis 69 (1):69 - 78 (2009)
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Abstract

According to the Simple View of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman , φ-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to φ. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman's counter-example – McCann's , Garcia's , Sverdlik's , Stout's , and Adams's – works. Therefore Bratman's contention that SV is false still stands

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2009-02-23

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Ezio Di Nucci
University of Copenhagen

Citations of this work

An epistemology for practical knowledge.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):159-177.
Frankfurt versus Frankfurt: a new anti-causalist dawn.Ezio Di Nucci - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):117-131.
Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View.Santiago Amaya - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1767-1786.
Embryo loss and double effect.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):537-540.

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References found in this work

Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
The intentional and the intended.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
Intentional and unintentional actions.Michael Gorr & Terence Horgan - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (2):251 - 262.

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