Acta Analytica 30 (1):87-95 (2015)

Colin Ruloff
Kwantlen Polytechnic University
In his Epistemic Justification , Swinburne offers a sophisticated and intuitively plausible causal-doxastic analysis of the basing relation that has escaped the attention of those working on this relation, where the basing relation can be understood as the relation that holds between a reason and one’s belief when the belief is held for that reason. In this paper, I aim to fill this lacuna in the literature by arguing that, despite its initial plausibility, Swinburne’s analysis of the basing relation is subject to a simple counterexample and so must be rejected
Keywords Swinburne  Basing  Justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-014-0222-z
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 56,999
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Epistemic Justification.Richard Swinburne - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
104 ( #95,493 of 2,410,259 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #244,680 of 2,410,259 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes