Identity theories of truth and the tractatus

Philosophical Investigations 28 (1):43–62 (2005)
Abstract
The paper is concerned with the idea that the world is the totality of facts, not of things – with what is involved in thinking of the world in that way, and why one might do so. It approaches this issue through a comparison between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the identity theory of truth proposed by Hornsby and McDowell.The paper’s positive conclusion is that there is a genuine affinity between these two. A negative contention is that the modern identity theory is vulnerable to a complaint of idealism that the Tractatus can deflect
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00240.x
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Unity of a Tractarian Fact.Colin Johnston - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):231-251.
D. Z. Phillips and Wittgenstein's on Certainty.Guy Stock - 2007 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (3):285–318.

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