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Comparison of confirmation measures
Cognition 103 (1):107-119 (2007)
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Citations of this work
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Indirect illusory inferences from disjunction: a new bridge between deductive inference and representativeness.Mathias Sablé-Meyer & Salvador Mascarenhas - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):567-592.
Relevance and Reason Relations.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Henrik Singmann & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S5):1202-1215.
The role of explanatory considerations in updating.Igor Douven & Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - Cognition 142 (C):299-311.
On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.
References found in this work
Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
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