Responsibility and the aims of theory: Strawson and revisionism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241 (2004)

Authors
Manuel Vargas
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
In recent years, reflection on the relationship between individual moral responsibility and determinism has undergone a remarkable renaissance. Incompatibilists, those who believe moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism, have offered powerful new arguments in support of their views. Compatibilists, those who think moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, have responded with ingenious counterexamples and alternative accounts of responsibility. Despite the admirable elevation of complexity and subtlety within both camps, the trajectory of the literature is somewhat discouraging. Every dialectical stalemate between incompatibilists and compatibilists seems to be superseded by a similar though often more subtle stalemate.1 The stalemates have two sources. On the one hand, incompatibilists again and again find powerful intuitive support from our folk concept. On the other hand, compatibilists seem right to insist that even if determinism were true, this would not mitigate our need for a concept of responsibility
Keywords Determinism  Ethics  Free Will  Responsibility  Revisionism  Strawson
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DOI 10.1111/j.0279-0750.2004.00195.x
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References found in this work BETA

Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.Margaret Olivia Little - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):541-544.
Elbow Room.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):423-425.
Responsibility.Mark Ravizza & J. R. Lucas - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):306.

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Citations of this work BETA

Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.
The Physiognomy of Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):381-417.
The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-290.

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