Intentionality deflated?
Philosophical Issues 8:117-126 (1997)
Abstract
Horwich’s paper is an intriguing and subtle attempt to extend deflationism from the theory of truth to the theory of meaning. Horwich endorses a use-theory of meaning which claims that one replacement instance of the schema “‘x’ means x”, e.g. “‘t1’ means t1”, is paraphrasable as U(‘t1’), while another replacement instance is..Author's Profile
DOI
10.2307/1522998
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