Intentionality deflated?

Philosophical Issues 8:117-126 (1997)
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Horwich’s paper is an intriguing and subtle attempt to extend deflationism from the theory of truth to the theory of meaning. Horwich endorses a use-theory of meaning which claims that one replacement instance of the schema “‘x’ means x”, e.g. “‘t1’ means t1”, is paraphrasable as U(‘t1’), while another replacement instance is..



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Alberto Voltolini
Università degli Studi di Torino

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