Does Klein's infinitism offer a response to Agrippa's trilemma?

Synthese 190 (6):1113-1130 (2013)

Authors
Abstract
The regress of reasons threatens an epistemic agent’s right to claim that any beliefs are justified. In response, Peter Klein’s infinitism argues that an infinite series of supporting reasons of the right type not only is not vicious but can make for epistemic justification. In order to resist the sceptic, infinitism needs to provide reason to think that there is at least one justified belief in the world. Under an infinitist conception this involves showing that at least one belief is supported by an infinite series of supporting reasons. This paper argues that showing this makes problems for the infinitist. The finite minds problem that prevents completion of an infinite series is well documented. This paper examines alternative attempts to provide evidence of infinity that the infinitist might take, whether by using a notion of justification without infinite reasons or by altering the notion of evidence. It concludes that both of these fail and consequently infinitism is unable to offer a solution to Agrippa’s trilemma
Keywords Justification  Infinitism  Scepticism  Peter Klein  Evidence of infinity  Finite minds
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9884-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 44,327
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Trouble with Infinitism.Andrew D. Cling - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):101 - 123.
On the Regress Argument for Infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.
Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.
Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.
Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Epistemology 5:199-208.
Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists.John Turri - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283.
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2009 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.
Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism.J. Aaron Simmons & Scott F. Aikin - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3):437-460.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-03-14

Total views
106 ( #76,615 of 2,271,524 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #414,702 of 2,271,524 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature