Philosophical and sociological approaches in technology have increasingly shifted toward describing AI (artificial intelligence) systems as ‘(moral) agents,’ while also attributing ‘agency’ to them. It is only in this way – so their principal argument goes – that the effects of technological components in a complex human-computer interaction can be understood sufficiently in phenomenological-descriptive and ethical-normative respects. By contrast, this article aims to demonstrate that an explanatory model only achieves a descriptively and normatively satisfactory result if the concepts of ‘(moral) (...) agent’ and ‘(moral) agency’ are exclusively related to human agents. Initially, the division between symbolic and sub-symbolic AI, the black box character of (deep) machine learning, and the complex relationship network in the provision and application of machine learning are outlined. Next, the ontological and action-theoretical basic assumptions of an ‘agency’ attribution regarding both the current teleology-naturalism debate and the explanatory model of actor network theory are examined. On this basis, the technical-philosophical approaches of Luciano Floridi, Deborah G. Johnson, and Peter-Paul Verbeek will all be critically discussed. Despite their different approaches, they tend to fully integrate computational behavior into their concept of ‘(moral) agency.’ By contrast, this essay recommends distinguishing conceptually between the different entities, causalities, and relationships in a human-computer interaction, arguing that this is the only way to do justice to both human responsibility and the moral significance and causality of computational behavior. (shrink)

In a representative vignette study in Germany with 1,653 respondents, we investigated laypeople’s attribution of moral responsibility in collaborative medical diagnosis. Specifically, we compare people’s judgments in a setting in which physicians are supported by an AI-based recommender system to a setting in which they are supported by a human colleague. It turns out that people tend to attribute moral responsibility to the artificial agent, although this is traditionally considered a category mistake in normative ethics. This tendency is stronger when (...) people believe that AI may become conscious at some point. In consequence, less responsibility is attributed to human agents in settings with hybrid diagnostic teams than in settings with human-only diagnostic teams. Our findings may have implications for behavior exhibited in contexts of collaborative medical decision making with AI-based as opposed to human recommenders because less responsibility is attributed to agents who have the mental capacity to care about outcomes. (shrink)

Malebranche affirmed the existence of the material world on the grounds of faith rather than reason. Religious dogma demanded the existence of the material world and Malebranche, the priest, acquiesced. Reason found the existence of the material world doubtful and, indeed, unnecessary. The existence of a material world different from and apart from minds conflicts with the proof of the economy of God's nature which Malebranche offered. Further, in inquiring into the probable nature of the material world Malebranche never successfully (...) avoided the conclusion that apart from a mind the material world is nothing. Malebranche thus came close to proving that the assumption of a material world is unnecessary even for theology, but the explicit statement of such a conclusion would have been too open a break with the church for a faithful member. Surely, however, the weight of Malebranche's reasoning and its implications for immaterialism would not be lost on one already interested in arguments against materialism. Berkeley's interest was such and Luce has shown that Berkeley read Malebranche carefully. Malebranche was the only thinker clearly inclining toward immaterialism whom Berkeley read. Is Malebranche, then, not the source of Berkeley's immaterialism? (shrink)

Interest in NFIB v. Sebelius has been extraordinarily high, from as soon as the legislation was passed, through lower court rulings, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, and the decision itself, both for its substantive holdings and the purported behind-the-scene dynamics. Legal blogs exploded with analysis, bioethicists opined on our collective responsibilities, and philosophers tackled concepts like ‘coercion’ and the activity/inactivity distinction. This volume aims to bring together scholars from disparate fields to analyze various features of the decision. It comprises (...) over twenty essays from a range of academic disciplines, namely law, philosophy, and political science. Essays are divided into five units: context and history, analyzing the opinions, individual liberty, Medicaid, and future implications. (shrink)

Pro-environmental behaviors symbolic of the three R’s—reduce, reuse, recycle—are focused on individual consumption and use patterns. These traditional environmentalist behaviors—what I shall call “shallow environmentalism”—are vulnerable to the problem of inconsequentialism, in that a single individual engaging in them does little to combat or mitigate climate change. Indeed, some argue that continued occupation with shallow environmental behaviors such as recycling and reducing travel gets in the way of fighting climate change by inappropriately focusing blame on individuals, wasting energy on ineffective (...) means, and creating a low benchmark by which people can measure whether they have done their environmental duty. Using environmental virtue ethics, I will argue for the importance of engaging in shallow environmentalism. I will use findings in behavioral psychology to show how these behaviors play an important role in fostering motivation and how behavioral alignment with popular understandings of environmentalism is related to perceptions of legitimacy of climate activists’ positions. (shrink)