What is the relation between the three following elements: words, pictures, and conceptual representations? And how do these three elements work, in defining and explaining metaphors? These are the questions that we tackle in our interdisciplinary contribution, which moves across cognitive linguistics, cognitive sciences, philosophy and semiotics. Within the cognitive linguistic tradition, scholars have assumed that there are equivalent and comparable structures characterizing the way in which metaphor works in language and in pictures. In this paper we analyze contextual visual (...) metaphors, which are considered to be the most complex ones, and we compare them to those that in language are called indirect metaphors. Our proposal is that a syllogistic mechanism of comprehension permeates both metaphors expressed in the verbal modality as well as metaphors expressed in the pictorial modality. While in the verbal modality the metaphoric syllogism is solved by inference, we argue that in the pictorial modality the role of inference is performed through mental imagery. (shrink)

The paper is an introduction to the third issue of the Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts. The authors give an account of the theories that have most enriched the study of images since the second half of the twentieth century: analytical philosophy and visual culture studies. A distinction is made between the two philosophical traditions. On the one hand, in particular within the context of analytic philosophy, images have been studied as single entities in relationship (...) with both a referent and the perceptual or interpretive abilities of an observer. On the other hand, thanks in particular to the iconographic tradition inaugurated by Aby Warburg, images have been analyzed in their multiplicity, in their mutual relationship, both synchronically and diachronically. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to match anomalous monism with some of Donald Davidson's theories about metaphorical meaning. In particular, I will use anomalous monism to justify Davidson's scepticism toward the paraphrase and to suggest an insight of the metaphor from the speaker's side, in contrast with the whole Davidson's theory of meaning, formulated – as is well known – from the interpreter's side.

The third issue of the Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts is centered on a series of questions related to the nature of images. What properties characterize them? Do they exist also in our minds? What relationship do they have with phenomena such as perception, memory, language and interpretation? The authors participating in this issue have been asked to answer these and other questions starting from and in dialogue with the two philosophical perspectives that have most (...) enriched the study of our object of research since the second half of the twentieth century: analytical philosophy and visual culture studies. The first four essays address problems related to ontology (Didi-Huberman, Prinz, Bantinaki, Manzotti). In their pages the question will be asked not only about the nature of images but also about what it means for an image to represent an object or an action realistically. The second part contains discussions related to the topics of perception, appreciation and creation of pictures (Ferretti; Gavaler, Goldberg; Pigoni, Coraci, Carlenzi). The third section goes through the problems related to the very concept of representing by images (Biggs; Weichert; Derby). The last section of the issue is devoted to two cases in which images are used not so much and not only to represent something, but also to convey ethical-political values (Fasnacht; Olesiejuk). (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to give a critical reading of Noël Carroll’s account of visual metaphors. In particular, I have highlighted the possible issues arising from his proposal, focusing on two aspects: 1) homospatiality is not the pictorial equivalent for the ‘is’ of identity that, according to Carroll, can be found in verbal metaphors of the kind «A is B». The ‘is’ of verbal metaphors predicates an intension of the metaphorizing term - that the interpreter is supposed to (...) grasp through the context - and does not suggest identity between A and B; 2) it is hard to sustain that the comprehension of pictorial metaphors relies on a visual perception not mediated by codes. The article ends taking the moves from one of the final considerations advanced by Carroll – namely that a visual metaphor is a device for encouraging imaginative insights – and moves further, trying to sketch out a theory of visual metaphor leveraging the key role of mental images in cognition. (shrink)

My intention in this paper is to show that the cognitive role of metaphor in Danto's approach is more modest than the one theorized by some contemporary philosophers. I argue that: 1) considering his enthymematic conception of metaphor, Danto endorses the idea that a metaphor brings to light an implicit feature of the "topic" and does not create a concept "ex-novo", 2) he needs to distinguish between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning, because of his artistic theory of indiscernible objects, 3) (...) Danto believes, as Josef Stern does, that a metaphor hides a demonstrative that entails a context-dependence. (shrink)

When Wittgenstein claims that "the expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged" (Wittgenstein 1953: 196), he expresses a paradox that Gombrich (Gombrich 1960) modifies in this way: (a 1) the observer x perceives a picture P under a new aspect; (b 1) if x perceives P under a new aspect then x's perception of P has changed; (c 1) but x's perception of P has (...) not actually changed. I argue that the Gombrich's version of the paradox has become the core of the problem of the pictorial representation. As I will explain, different approaches to depiction solve the paradox by denying one among (a 1)-(c 1). Gombrich rejects (c 1). Wollheim rejects (a 1). The so-called psychological theories of depiction also reject (a 1). Every theory of depiction should face what I call the Fictional Issue (FI) and the Representational Issue (RI). Attempting to solve FI and RI, I shall explore an alternative, Wittgensteinian solution, which implies to reject (b 1). To do this, we have to interpret the seeing-as as made of two kinds of perception: a simple perception and a representational perception. (shrink)