BackgroundSince the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social restriction measures, online therapy is a life-saving possibility for patients with acute stress. Wiring Affect with ReAttach is a brief psychological intervention aiming to decrease negative affect, that can be offered online.MethodsWe assessed the effect of remote W.A.R.A. on negative affect in 37 patients. Consequently, we compared the effect of remote W.A.R.A. versus face-to-face W.A.R.A on negative affect in a cross-sectional design.ResultsW.A.R.A. remote therapy provoked a significant reduction of negative affect (...) with a large effect size. However, the reduction on negative affect was smaller than with W.A.R.A. face-to-face. We found a substantial difference between W.A.R.A. remote therapy and W.A.R.A. face-to-face in decrease of negative affect.LimitationsThe major limitation of the pilot-study is the sample size of 37 patients. Besides, we designed a numeric rating scale for evaluating negative affect. We investigated the impact on negative affect by assessing “unpleasant feelings.” This conceptualization of negative affect might still be a point of discussion.ConclusionThe study’s findings indicated that W.A.R.A. remote therapy significantly reduced negative affect, but to a lesser extent than W.A.R.A. face-to-face. Nevertheless, W.A.R.A. remote therapy might offer a fast relief, especially when personal contact is difficult. (shrink)

L'étude des formes paradoxales chez Ménandre le rhéteur et les humanistes du XVIe siècle, Agrippa de Nettesheim, Montaigne, ainsi que chez Molière, Chamfort...

Du sommaire: Ambiguite et comprehension du langage (Paul Bogaards, Johan Rooryck). - Why pluralities don't mean a thing (Crit Cremers). - Aspects of interlingual ambiguity: polyglot punning (Dirk Delabastita). - Les feux de Saint-Antoine (Sjef Houppermans). - The semantics of Dutch moeten 'must, should, have to' from a typological and a relevance-theoretical perspective (Theo Janssen). - L'ambiguite en langue et en discours (Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni).".

There is a growing consensus that the offer of a reasonable compensation for oocyte donation for reproductive treatment is acceptable if it does not compromise voluntary and altruistically motivated donation. However, how to translate this ‘reasonable compensation’ in practice remains unclear as compensation rates offered to oocyte donors between different European Union countries vary significantly. Clinics involved in oocyte donation, as well as those in other medical contexts, might be encouraged in calculating a more consistent and transparent compensation for donors (...) if the elements that constitute a reasonable compensation are explicated. In doing so, lessons can be learnt from living organ donation and medical research participation. Practices in which the elements of a reasonable compensation for the individuals involved have already been more defined in the literature. By means of analogical reasoning, we will outline the different components of a reasonable compensation and subsequently apply these to the context of oocyte donation. We will argue that oocyte donors should first of all be reasonably reimbursed direct expenses related to the donation, without standard remuneration of lost wages. Second, donating oocytes requests a serious time investment, therefore donors are entitled to suitable compensation for their time spent and efforts made. Finally, we will explain that a reasonable compensation consisting of these two components allows for altruism to remain the key value of oocyte donation for reproductive treatment. However, if we acknowledge that donors’ motives are more complex and often include reasons from self-interest, the reasonable compensation may be complemented with modest (non)monetary benefits. (shrink)

It is probably true that the greater number of contemporary American anthropologists feel that “theory” is a very dangerous kind of business which the careful anthropologist must be on his guard against. This statement represents, in the first instance, merely a crude induction from my experience in talking with professional anthropologists. It is, however, symptomatic that not until 1933 did a book by an American anthropologist include the word “theory” in its title. Only a single book published subsequently is explicitly (...) given over to anthropological theory, and this avowedly concentrates upon the historical development of theories rather than upon a fresh and extended analysis of the more abstract aspects of anthropological thought. But because anthropology still painfully remembers the stomach-ache it got from the too easy generalizations of many nineteenth century “arm-chair ethnologists” is insufficient reason, it seems to me, for that almost morbid avoidance of theory which tends to produce acute indigestion from sheer bulk of unordered concrete observations. Landheer has with some justice commented. (shrink)