Elżbieta Kałuszyńska argues her anti-representationism (scil. anti-realism).

In the article the possibility of an access to reality, and thus the possibility of an attainment of truth is discussed. In the contrary of Adam Grobler's claims it is argued that the problem with the relation language-reality is not an interpretation of a language in a way fitting the reality, but a search for an appropriate language, a conceptual frame to grasp recognized phenomena. So a recognition of reality is primary, not a language.

The author claims that there is a crisis in contemporary philosophy of science. She tries to show a way out of this situation by rejecting the framework of logical empiricism.

A contemporary analytic philosophy approach to science is discussed. It is pointed out that enthusiasm for language studies in philosophy has been recently grossly exaggerated. A role of experimental science as a source of "profound" questions about the essence of the world should be more appreciated. It is shown that the so-called common intuitions fail to capture the gist of current problems in science and can no longer lead us to faithful solutions. For instance, it is not easy to reconcile (...) with common intuitions a vision of the world as a set of latent potential possibilities which show up themselves only under certain conditions. Therefore, dynamic description of the world is proposed to treat both phenomena and various processes among them. In order to achieve this we ought to focus on fates of allegedly fundamental theories and on a strategy of making science. The latter is thoroughly discussed in this article. Furthermore, three types of reductionism are scrutinized and it leads us to the conclusion that our understanding of the world is more likely based on our ability to explain diversified phenomena than on our capacity to reduce them to the ostensibly fundamental models or theories. (shrink)

In this essay the author defends the traditional view of science: science as an activity of approaching the truthful knowledge about real world. Accepting this, she then analyses the main topics of contemporary philosophy of science, such as language of science, scientific laws, differences between empirical theories and models, and the question of truthfulness in science.