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  1. Francisco Calvo Garzón & Ángel García Rodríguez (2009). Where is Cognitive Science Heading? Minds and Machines 19 (3):301-318.
    According to Ramsey (Representation reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007 ), only classical cognitive science, with the related notions of input–output and structural representations, meets the job description challenge (the challenge to show that a certain structure or process serves a representational role at the subpersonal level). By contrast, connectionism and other nonclassical models, insofar as they exploit receptor and tacit notions of representation, are not genuinely representational. As a result, Ramsey submits, cognitive science is taking a U-turn from (...)
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    Francisco Calvo Garzón (2001). Can We Turn a Blind Eye to Eliminativism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):485-498.
    In this paper I shall reply to two arguments that Stephen Stich (1990; 1991; 1996) has recently put forward against the thesis of eliminative materialism. In a nutshell, Stich argues that (i) the thesis of eliminative materialism, according to which propositional attitudes don't exist, is neither true nor false, and that (ii) even if it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To support (i) and (ii) Stich relies on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of reference (...)
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    Francisco Calvo Garzón (2003). Is Simplicity Alethic for Semantic Theories? NTU Philosophical Review 26:31-50.
    Crispin Wright has reshaped debates about Realism by offering a new landscape of what's at stake in the discussions between realists and their opponents. Instead of arguing whether a given discourse can be truth apt, discussion should focus, Wright contends, on what kind of truth predicate a discourse can enjoy. Namely, whether truth for a discourse can be 'robust' or merely ‘minimal' Wright's approach has important implications for Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. The bulk of this paper (...)
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    Francisco Calvo Garzón (2005). Rules, Similarity, and the Information-Processing Blind Alley. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):17-18.
    Pothos's revision of rules and similarity in the area of language illustrates the impression that the classicist/connectionist debate is in a blind alley. Under his continuum proposal, both hypotheses fall neatly within the information-processing paradigm. In my view, the paradigm shift that dynamic systems theory represents (Spencer & Thelen 2003) should be submitted to critical scrutiny. Specific formalizations of the Rules versus Similarity distinction may not lead to a form of unification under Generalized Context Models or connectionist networks.
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    Francisco Calvo Garzón (2004). Issues of Implementation Matter for Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):397-398.
    I argue that a dynamical framing of the emulation theory of representation may be at odds with its articulation in Grush's information-processing terms. An architectural constraint implicit in the emulation theory may have consequences not envisaged in the target article. In my view, “how the emulator manages to implement the forward mapping” is pivotal with regard to whether we have an emulation theory of representation, as opposed to an emulation theory of (mere) applied forces.
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  6. Francisco Calvo GarzÓn (2000). Semantic Perversity. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (2).
     
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  7. Francisco Calvo Garzon (2002). The Connectionist Sceptic Versus the “Full-Blooded" Semanticist. NTU Philosophical Review 25:177-209.
    Gareth Evans produced a powerfulline of argument against Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. In one part of his attack, Evans argued that, under certain conditions, structural simplicity may become truth-conducive for semantic theories. Being structurally more complex than the standard semantic theory, perverse semantic theories a la Quine are an easy prey for Evans' considerations. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to addressing Evans' criticism. By reviewing the classical/connectionist debate in cognitive science between a hypothetical (...)
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