Truth Bearers

Edited by Patrick Greenough (University of St. Andrews)
Assistant editor: Michaela Lobo
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  1. The Notion of Truth in Natural and Formal Languages.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    For any natural (human) or formal (mathematical) language L we know that an expression X of language L is true if and only if there are expressions Γ of language L that connect X to known facts. -/- By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that evaluate to neither True nor False.
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  2. Propositions Are Not Representational.Thomas D. Brown - 2021 - Synthese:1-16.
    It is often presumed by those who use propositions in their theories that propositions are representational; that is, that propositions represent the world as being some way. This paper makes two claims against this presumption. First, it argues that it does not follow from the fact that propositions play the theoretical roles usually attributed to them that they are representational. This conclusion is reached by rebutting three arguments that can be made in support of the claim that propositions are representational. (...)
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  3. Fact Fusion, Fact Fission, and the Slingshot.Justin Robert Clarke - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (2):261-277.
    If certain versions of the correspondence theory of truth are correct, then truth can be informatively defined as correspondence to facts; facts would be truth-makers, and we could explain truth in terms of truth-bearers, correspondence, and truth-makers. I explain how slingshot arguments work generally, as collapsing arguments (regardless of their targets). Working through the slingshots of Davidson, and Gödel, I claim that Davidson’s slingshot involves dubitable premises, but that Gödel’s slingshot is terminal to certain versions of the correspondence theory, as (...)
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  4. Propositions and Truth-Bearers.Jeffrey C. King - 2018 - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford handbook of truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-332.
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  5. Metaphor, Truth, and Representation.Richmond Kwesi - 2018 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Objects of Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Berlin, Germany: pp. 117-146.
    Do metaphorical sentences express facts or represent states of affairs in the world? Can a metaphorical statement tell us ‘what there is’? These questions raise the issue of whether metaphors can be used to make truth-claims; that is, whether metaphors can be regarded as assertions that can be evaluated as true or false. Some theorists on metaphor have argued for a negative answer to the above-mentioned questions. They have claimed, among others, that metaphorical utterances are non-descriptive uses of language (Blackburn (...)
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  6. Modeling Truth.Paul Teller - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):143-161.
    Many in philosophy understand truth in terms of precise semantic values, true propositions. Following Braun and Sider, I say that in this sense almost nothing we say is, literally, true. I take the stand that this account of truth nonetheless constitutes a vitally useful idealization in understanding many features of the structure of language. The Fregean problem discussed by Braun and Sider concerns issues about application of language to the world. In understanding these issues I propose an alternative modeling tool (...)
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  7. Pluralism and the Liar.Cory Wright - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford University Press. pp. 347–373.
    Pluralists maintain that there is more than one truth property in virtue of which bearers are true. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how they diagnose the liar paradox or what resources they have available to treat it. This chapter considers one recent attempt by Cotnoir (2013b) to treat the Liar. It argues that pluralists should reject the version of pluralism that Cotnoir assumes, discourse pluralism, in favor of a more naturalized approach to truth predication in real languages, which should (...)
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  8. Wollen und Wahrheit.Michael Schmitz - 2016 - In Neil Roughley & Julius Schälike (eds.), Wollen. Seine Bedeutung, seine Grenzen. Münster: Mentis. pp. 43-70.
    In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich, dass die Standardauffassung von Propositionen und propositionalen Einstellungen inadäquat ist, ein Artefakt der gegenwärtig herrschenden theorielastigen Auffassung von Intentionalität, Sprache und Rationalität, und skizziere eine alternative Auffassung. Im folgenden Abschnitt belege ich erst einmal die These der Theorielastigkeit anhand einiger Beispiele vor allem aus der gegenwärtigen analytischen Philosophie. Der dritte Abschnitt erklärt, wie diese Theorielastigkeit im Standardverständnis von Propositionen und propositionalen Einstellungen verkörpert ist. Im vierten Abschnitt argumentiere ich, dass dieses Standardverständnis der Proposition zwei unvereinbare (...)
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  9. 'Truth Predicates' in Natural Language.Friederike Moltmann - 2015 - In Dora Achourioti, Henri Galinon & José Martinez (eds.), Unifying Theories of Truth. Springer. pp. 57-83.
    This takes a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of apparent truth predicates in English and re-evaluates the way they could motivate particular philosophical views regarding the formal status of 'truth predicates' and their semantics. The paper distinguishes two types of 'truth predicates' and proposes semantic analyses that better reflect the linguistic facts. These analyses match particular independently motivated philosophical views.
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  10. Truth and Truth Bearers: Meaning in Context Volume Ii.Mark Richard - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book collects nine seminal essays by Mark Richard published between 1980 and 2014, alongside four new essays and an introduction that puts the essays in context. Each essay is an attempt, in one way or another, to understand the idea of a proposition. Part I discusses whether the objects of thought and assertion can change truth value over time. Part II develops and defends a relativist view of the objects of assertion and thought; and Part III discusses issues having (...)
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  11. Truth and Bivalence in Aristotle. An Investigation Into the Structure of Saying.Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe & María Cerezo - 2014 - In N. Öffenberger & A. Vigo (eds.), Zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. G. Olms.
    The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample to Bivalence. (...)
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  12. What Are the Primary Bearers of Truth?Peter Hanks - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):558-574.
    (2013). What are the primary bearers of truth? Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 558-574.
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  13. Review of "Truth". [REVIEW]Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):13.
  14. Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid.Stephen Barker - 2011 - In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. Cambridge University Press.
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
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  15. Truth-Bearers and Modesty.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):49–75.
    In this paper I discuss Künne’s Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry that Field expresses with respect to Horwich’s related view. The worry is not that deflationary accounts are false, but rather that, because they take propositions as truth-bearers, they are not philosophically interesting. Compatibly with the intuitions of ordinary speakers, we can understand proposition so that the proposals do account for a property that such truth-bearers have. Nevertheless, we saliently apply the truth-concept also to (...)
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  16. Simplicity Made Difficult. [REVIEW]John MacFarlane - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):441 - 448.
  17. Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  18. The Unity of the Proposition: Replies to Vallicella, Schnieder, and García‐Carpintero.Richard Gaskin - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):303-311.
    Richard Gaskin presents a work in the philosophy of language.
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  19. Reasoning with Truth.Peter Roeper - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):275-306.
    The aim of the paper is to formulate rules of inference for the predicate 'is true' applied to sentences. A distinction is recognised between (ordinary) truth and definite truth and consequently between two notions of validity, depending on whether truth or definite truth is the property preserved in valid arguments. Appropriate sets of rules of inference governing the two predicates are devised. In each case the consequence relation is in harmony with the respective predicate. Particularly appealing is a set of (...)
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  20. Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Tensions in the Theory of Truth.Paul Saka - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):125-135.
    Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well, perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not generally want (...)
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  21. Truth-Makers and Truth-Bearers.John Bigelow - 2009 - In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
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  22. Truth and Words.Gary Ebbs - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Gary Ebbs shows that this appearance is illusory.
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  23. Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time.Stephan Torre - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...)
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  24. What is Truth?C. J. F. Williams - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    A study in philosophical logic of the meaning of 'true'. Dr Williams demonstrates the shortcomings of various analyses which interpret 'true' as a predicate or truth as a relational property, and clears up a number of important points about propositions, quantification, definite descriptions and correspondence. This 'deflationary metaphysics' is interwoven with a positive theory of his own, which seeks to develop ideas about the late Arthur Prior. The work is marked throughout by great clarity, precision and thoroughness.
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  25. Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features.C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):67 - 73.
    We argue that it would seem to be a mistake to blame Liar-like paradox on certain features of the object language, since the effect can be created with very minimal object languages that contain none of the usual suspects (truth-like predicates, reference to their own truth-bearers, negation, etc.).
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  26. John Buridan on the Bearer of Logical Relations.Ernesto Perini-Santos - 2008 - Logica Universalis 2 (1):59-70.
    . According to John Buridan, the time for which a statement is true is underdetermined by the grammatical form of the sentence – the intention of the speaker is required. As a consequence, truth-bearers are not sentence types, nor sentence tokens plus facts of the context of utterance, but statements. Statements are also the bearers of logical relations, since the latter can only be established among entities having determined truth-conditions. This role of the intention of the speaker in the determination (...)
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  27. Truth and What is Said.Elia Zardini - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):545-574.
    A notion of truth as applicable to events of assertoric use ( utterances ) of a sentence token is arguably presupposed and required by our evaluative practices of the use of language. The truth of an utterance seems clearly to depend on what the utterance says . This fundamental dependence seems in turn to be captured by the schema that, if an utterance u says that P , then u is true iff P . Such a schema may thus be (...)
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  28. Deflationism: A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate.Arvid Båve - 2006 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is (...)
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  29. True in a Sense.Andrea Iacona - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):141-154.
    The aim of this paper is to show that in order to make sense of the ascription of truth and falsity to the things we say it is essential to acknowledge a divergence between two basic intuitions. According to one of them it is plausible to talk of what is said as what the speaker has in mind. According to the other it is plausible to talk of what is said as the bearer of truth or falsity. The paper presents (...)
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  30. Truthmakers Without Truth.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (2):53–71.
    It is often taken for granted that truth is mind-independent, i.e. that, necessarily, if the world is objectively speaking in a certain way, then it is true that it is that way, independently of anyone thinking that it is that way. I argue that proponents of correspondence-truth, in particular immanent realists, should not take the mind-independence of truth for granted. The assumption that the mind-independent features of the world, i.e. ‘facts’, determine the truth of propositions, does not entail that truth (...)
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  31. Aristotle on Truth.Alex Orenstein - 2006 - Review of Metaphysics 59 (4):875-877.
    Too often Aristotle’s account of truth is summed up by repeating some variant of “to say of what is that it is and of what it is not that it is not, is to say the true; while to say of what is that it is not or of what is not that it is, is to say the false,” and matters are left at that. Or worse still, it is simply described as a “correspondence theory.” The importance of Paolo (...)
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  32. Imperativos, preceptos y normas.Lorenzo Peña - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 39:111-142.
    The paper goes into the intricate logical relation between imperatives, precepts and norms. It shows that there need not be two senses of "ought", the one descriptive and the other prescriptive, since when the law-giver enacts a fresh statute he is hereby making a tru statement, whose truth is grounded on the statement itself.
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  33. Abstracting Propositions.Anthony Wrigley - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):157-176.
    This paper examines the potential for abstracting propositions – an as yet untested way of defending the realist thesis that propositions as abstract entities exist. I motivate why we should want to abstract propositions and make clear, by basing an account on the neo-Fregean programme in arithmetic, what ontological and epistemological advantages a realist can gain from this. I then raise a series of problems for the abstraction that ultimately have serious repercussions for realism about propositions in general. I first (...)
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  34. From the Act of Judging to the Sentence: The Problem of Truth Bearers From Bolzano to Tarski.Jan Wole'nski & Artur Rojszczak - 2005 - Springer.
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  35. A Pragmatic View of Truth.Luiz H. A. Dutra - 2004 - Principia 8 (2):259-277.
    This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...)
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  36. A Pragmatic View of Truth.Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra - 2004 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (2):259-277.
    This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...)
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  37. The Logical Function of ‘That’, or Truth, Propositions and Sentences.Jonathan Harrison - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (1):67-96.
    (i) It is propositions, not sentences, that are true or false. It is true ‘Dogs bark’ does not make sense. It is true that dogs bark does. (ii) and (iii) Davidson wrong about ‘that’. (iv) The difference between ‘implies’ and ‘if ... then ...’. (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) Russell, not Quine, right about the subject matter of logic. (ix) The objectual and substitutional interpretations of quantifiers compatible. (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv) and (xvi) Implications for well-known theories of (...)
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  38. Bivalence and the Challenge of Truth-Value Gaps.Teresa Marques - 2004 - Dissertation, Stirling
    This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true nor false. I (...)
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  39. Is Simplicity Alethic for Semantic Theories?Francisco Calvo Garzón - 2003 - NTU Philosophical Review 26:31-50.
    Crispin Wright has reshaped debates about Realism by offering a new landscape of what's at stake in the discussions between realists and their opponents. Instead of arguing whether a given discourse can be truth apt, discussion should focus, Wright contends, on what kind of truth predicate a discourse can enjoy. Namely, whether truth for a discourse can be 'robust' or merely ‘minimal' Wright's approach has important implications for Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. The bulk of this paper (...)
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  40. A Dilemma For Robust Alethic Relativism.William Ferraiolo - 2002 - Sorites 14:36-41.
    Robust alethic relativism is the thesis that no truth bearer is objectively true or false. According to the robust alethic relativist, the most we can ever say of any truth bearer is that it is true or false relative to some conceptual framework, worldview, or other parameter . In this paper, I will argue that robust alethic relativism is either self-refuting, or an entirely trivial and uninteresting thesis that cannot coherently serve as a theory of truth. I hope to show (...)
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  41. Propositions.Andrea Iacona - 2002 - Name.
  42. Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers.Jody Azzouni - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):329-354.
    A new approach to truth is offered which dispenses with the truth predicate, and replaces it with a special kind of quantifier which simultaneously binds variables in sentential and nominal positions. The resulting theory of truth for a (first-order) language is shown to be able to handle blind truth ascriptions, and is shown to be compatible with a characterization of the semantic and syntactic principles governing that language. Comparisons with other approaches to truth are drawn. An axiomatization of AU-quantifiers and (...)
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  43. Truth-Bearers and the Liar – a Reply to Alan Weir.Laurence Goldstein - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):115–126.
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  44. Truth & Use.Hans Seigfried - 2001 - Synthese 128 (1-2):1 - 13.
    I show why the standard textbook argument against thepragmatist reconstruction of truth should be dismissedas a fallacy. It only works if one inadvertentlysubstitutes for the pragmatist concept of knowledge anunreconstructed one that predates the experimentalrevolution in philosophy (likened to the Copernicanrevolution in astronomy) started by Kant and completedby Dewey. I argue (as did Dewey against Russell) thatthe concept of propositions as mental reconstructionsof what is the case converts a function in inquiryinto an independent structure, which is anotherfallacy.
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  45. All Facts Great and Small.Richard N. Manning - 1998 - ProtoSociology 11:18-40.
    I examine the arguments Donald Davidson has offered through the years concerning the ontological bona fides of facts. In "Truth and Meaning", Davidson uses the so-called "slingshot" argument to the effect that if true sentences refer, then they are all coreferential. Through a detailed examination of the assumptions underlying this argument, I show that, while it is effective as part of a reductio of bottom-up, reference based semantics, it has no tendency to establish the truth of its negative conclusion concerning (...)
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  46. Südamerikanische Beiträge Zur Modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik.Niels Öffenberger & Alejandro G. Vigo (eds.) - 1997 - G. Olms.
  47. Relativism-Pragmatism and the Goals of Cognition.Nenad Miščević - 1995 - Pragmatics and Cognition 3 (1):111-131.
    The central goal of cognition is truth. This thesis is defended against the new wave relativist-pragmatists, notably Stephen Stich. First, the relativist-pragma-tist stance and its central line of argumentation is briefly presented, pivoting around the plurality of TRUTH-predicates. Against this, the following theses are argued for: various TRUTH-predicates are not in semantic, epistemic, and instrumental competition, and they will stand for the same higher-level epistemic goal — believing and saying "p" only if p; the choice among TRUTH-predicates for natural languages (...)
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  48. The Bearer of Truth and Falsity.Mark Roberts - 1994 - Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):59-67.
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  49. Revised Factualism.Thomas C. Ryckman - 1994 - The Monist 77 (2):207-216.
    I shall argue that those who hold that there are factual complexes, or facts, and who subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth, according to which truth is analyzed in terms of correspondence to facts, need not hold that, in addition to facts, there are propositions.
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  50. Direct Realism, Skepticism and Truth.John Peterson - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1):147-150.
    If (1) a person's knowing a proposition P implies that P is true and if (2) facts are unidentical with true propositions then in knowing P a person does not know a fact. Unless the correspondence view of truth is abandoned, this skepticism as regards facts cannot be answered by denying (2). If facts are identical with true propositions then facts are (trivially) true. But if truth consists in a correspondence to fact then every fact, being true, corresponds to a (...)
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