Objectives: To examine the willingness of patients to participate in a resuscitation study that requires exception from informed consent and to determine if willingness to participate is associated with demographic and other characteristics.Methods: Adult patients in an emergency department and in a geriatric outpatient clinic were surveyed. Patients were asked to imagine that they presented to an emergency department with cardiac arrest and asked about their willingness to receive a new drug outside of a study, receive a new drug as (...) part of a study and participate in a randomised controlled trial for a new drug. Patients were also asked about participation in studies of invasive procedures.Results: 213 patients from a geriatric clinic and 207 from an emergency department were surveyed. Two thirds of patients from the geriatric clinic and 83% from the emergency department were willing to receive an experimental drug outside of a study. Patients were less willing to participate in a study of the new drug and even less likely to participate in an RCT for the new drug . Patients were less likely to participate in a study of thoracotomy than in a study that required placement of a femoral catheter . Willingness to participate was not associated with trust in the doctors.Conclusions: Study design and invasiveness of the intervention were associated with the willingness of patients to participate in resuscitation studies that require exception from informed consent. (shrink)

A pioneeting Arab thinker -- Early life -- The house of wisdom -- Religion, philosophy, and intellect -- On the subjects of intellect and sorrow -- The scientist -- Musician, calligrapher, and code breaker -- Legacy.

The sources of Singer's moral philosophy -- The origins of ethics -- Reason and ethics -- Key aspects of Singer's ethical system -- Singer's critique of human dignity -- Infanticide a new frontier.

Introduction: Globally, vitamin D deficiency is one of the most common deficiencies, affecting nearly half the world's population. The objective of this survey was to assess and compare the knowledge about vitamin D and the perceived state of health in Emirati and international tourist female students in Dubai, UAE. Methods: This is a cross-sectional study that took place in universities in Dubai, UAE. This survey consisted of 17 multiple choice questions. The first part of the survey assessed levels of supplementation, (...) diet and UV exposure. Another section evaluated the participants’ self-assessed state of health regarding vitamin D testing, symptoms related to vitamin D deficiency and general welbeing. The collected data were statistically analyzed using SPSS statistics for windows version 26.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Statistical significance was set at P<0.05. Results: 105 respondents were Emiratis and 65 were international students. The average age was 21, with an average BMI 23.3. Almost one-third of each group reported using Vitamin D supplements once weekly. The majority of both groups reported rarely getting tanned. Almost all participants reported regular consumption of Vitamin-D rich foods. In both groups, more than half reported consuming milk and cheese regularly and up to one-third reported consuming fish in a regular manner. Although more than half of the students rated their health as good; more than two-thirds reported experiencing muscle pain; only half reported having their blood Vitamin D levels measured once; half reported experiencing problems with concentration and more than three-quarters reported experiencing bad mood in the past month. The prevalence of these symptoms was almost similar across different categories of vitamin D supplementation, tanning habits, dietary intake, or nationality. No statistically significant differences were noted between the 2 groups. Conclusion: more Emirati students were aware of the association between vitamin D and osteoporosis than International tourist students (40% vs. 21.9%, respectively; p<0.05). On the other hand, both groups had lower knowledge about the relationship between vitamin D deficiency and depression, Rheumatoid Arthritis and Hypertension, and the optimal vitamin D level; however, no statistically significant differences were noted regarding this knowledge of Emiratis and international students. (shrink)

The informed consent process provides protection by ensuring that potential research subjects understand the goals of the research project they are being asked to voluntarily partake in as well as the risks associated with the study. We examined subjects' comprehension and ability to identify issues explicitly raised during the consent process that was conducted as part of their participation in a genetic family study (GFS). We employed cross-sectional design by providing a short, self-administrative questionnaire to 246 participants recruited from families (...) enrolled in the Extended Family Investigation of Nephropathy and Diabetes (EFIND) study conducted at the University of Texas Health Science Center. Participants responded to the questionnaire directly after their enrollment in the EFIND study. The questionnaire consisted of multiple-choice questions and focused on the understanding of the purposes, procedures, and risks associated with their participation in the EFIND study. These questions were formulated to reflect basic information presented to subjects through the consent process. Responses to questions were expressed as percentages, placing equal weight on each response. Participants were Mexican-American, 62.3% female and averaged 35.2 ± 12.7 years old (range: 18-76). Our findings showed that the average comprehension score was 58. About 30% of the participants did not know the name of the study, and 70% did not identify all elements related to the study procedures. The most striking finding was the lack of understanding concerning the social risks associated with participation in EFIND. While 35.1% of participants identified all potential physical risks, only 1.3% could identify all of the social risks. Our findings showed that participants comprehension score was significantly associated with their level of education and income. We conclude that using the informed consent process to communicate research social risks to subjects participating in GFS has some limitations. Future research directed at improving risk communications to subjects of low socioeconomic levels participating in genetic research is justified. (shrink)

This book gathers case studies presented at the International Conference on Responsible Research and Innovation in Science, Innovation and Society. It highlights European initiatives and projects in various domains and contexts, each of which explores how to create guidelines and good practices for Responsible Research and Innovation and how to promote them among citizens, industry stakeholders, policy and decision makers, research funders and educational institutions to foster their adoption as a potential benchmark in establishing RRI processes. Further, the book discusses (...) gender and ethical issues, which are highly relevant for RRI initiatives in connection with representativeness, risks and in some cases, minority rights. (shrink)

This book provides methods and practical cases and experiences with the aim of stimulating Responsible Research and Innovation through the direct engagement of researchers, Civil Society Organisations, citizens, industry stakeholders, policy and decision makers, research funders and communicators. The book furthermore aims to advance debate on Responsible Research and Innovation and also to reinforce the RRI community identity. With chapters covering governance, public engagement and inclusion in responsible R&D and innovation processes; RRI actions in science education and communication; gender and (...) ethical issues in RRI initiatives; and sustainability of RRI processes, the book is solidly part of the Europe 2020 strategy to promote a vision for a stronger collaborations between social, natural and physical scientists and the societal actors for a wider dimensions of science and innovation and the role in environmental preservation. (shrink)

The matter of ḥusn (goodness) and qubḥ (evil), which is the result of the disagreements on the source of moral value in human actions, is one of the main disputes between the Sunnī schools and the Muʿtazilī school of theology. This study examines the reasons why Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, the Ash‘arī scholar, argues that the values of the ḥusn- qubḥ in actions are relative (i‘tibārī) against to the Mu‘tazilī school that considers these values to be inherent in actions. According to (...) the Ash‘arīs, and specifically al-Āmidī, if the actions make people worth of either praise in this world and reward (thawāb) in afterlife or blame in this world and punishment in afterlife, those actions are named as ḥasan (good) or qabīḥ (bad). Therefore, if the action of a person provides him/her praise in this world and reward in afterlife, the action is called ḥasan. If an action necessitates condemnation in this world and punishment in the afterlife, the action is called qabīḥ. The moral values in actions can only be determined by the Sharī‘a. In other words, human reason cannot know which actions are included in the category of ḥasan and qabīḥ. In addition to their contentious meanings in the doctrine, ḥasan and qabīḥ have two more meanings. The first one is the suitability and contrariety to the purpose or disposition while the second one is the agent’s right of doing any given action. However, there is no debate about these two meanings. (shrink)

In this article, disasters as a factual reality will be discussed within the framework of Allah's justice and human responsibility on the basis of husn-qubh. In this context, the ontic structure of man and the universe, man's being in the process of being tested, the definition of good-bad/goodness-evil that enables this process, the evaluations in the literature, and the meaning of taklīf within the scope of Allah's justice (‘adl) will be discussed. The problem of evil is the problem of (...) reconciling a God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and does good deeds with a universe in which evil exists. As a problem of evil, disaster is a phenomenon that must be addressed in relation to God, the universe, and human beings. While its relation with God in terms of creation appears as the legality of the universe, its relation with human beings in terms of dealing with the phenomenon and responsibility is within the scope of being subject to the offer. Therefore, a correct understanding of creation and justification of the reasonableness of the offer will answer many questions regarding disasters. The aforementioned issues and concepts in the theological literature have been discussed thoroughly (dakīk) in the schools of theology. Theologians defined God and divine action, human beings and human actions, and the universe in accordance with the paradigm of their discourse groups, and they made discussions based on the meaning they gave to these definitions and concepts. The basic determinants of the discussions are God's possession of knowledge, power, will, wisdom, and justice, and the creation of human beings in the nature of reason (‘akl). These concepts and definitions have been understood differently by the discourse groups, and the debates have moved back and forth between determination/compulsion and free will. It makes sense here that a person who experiences the phenomenon and wants to know what is happening theologically should know the Qur'anic conception of God and man. The relationship between God and man needs to be right and moral. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the topics that have been studied many times in terms of each concept together. In this respect, the article aims to seek answers to some questions about the human profile and the conception of Allah. There are three aspects to be questioned here: First, an ontological inquiry into the nature of the concepts of existence that contain moral value; second, an epistemological inquiry into whether moral value is determined by reason or revelation. In this context, the last inquiry is moral. Accordingly, what is good-bad and goodness-evil? What determines good and evil as a value? Who is the agent of the good-evil action? What is the position of the divine will if the perpetrator (fā‘ıl) is human? What is the relationship or boundary between divine will and human responsibility? What is the theological status of the perpetrator? On this basis, what is a disaster? What is the value judgment of disasters? What is the relation of disasters to God's actions? Who is the perpetrator of disasters? Are disasters a test? Are disasters a divine warning? Are disasters a divine punishment? If they are a divine punishment, what is the possibility of knowing it? These questions will be answered in the article, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly. (shrink)

The subject of human acts has been one of the controversial topics of kalām since the first centuries of Islam. A lot of concerning human acts –from divine attributes to divine decree and destiny, from the issue of good and evil (ḥusn and Qubḥ) to the boundaries of the reasoning, from the accountability with impossible things to the rational accountability, from the topics of substance and accident to causality- has been said and written in the history of Islamic tought. In (...) this study, the subject was discussed especially within the scope of man’s on his own action in connection with the divine knowledge, will, and power. On this issue, the Muʻtazila argues that human beings are independent in doing their good and evil acts with the power that God has given to them because of His will and wisdom, and that the evil actions that they have done cannot be associated with the divine attributes in any way. Sunnī theologians assert that God creates human actions through man’s orginated power. They also arguethat evil acts are not independent of the Divine Creation although human beings are the reason of evil in terms of thier acquisition (kasb) and will (irāda). Nevertheless, the representetives of the Sunnī kalām (Asharites and Māturīdis) differ on their account of acquisition, which expresses man’s agency in his acts. In contrary to the Mātūrīdiya, the Ashʻariya holds that acquisition is a created act of God. On the other hand, the Mashshai (peripatetic) philosophers, who are opposed by teologians on some issues such as divine attributes and the working of activity/acts in nature, consider human’s actions part of the eternal chain of cause-effect that emanate (al fayḍ) from the First Principle. However, according to them, every link of this chain is formed by the divine providence (al-ināyah). They also attribute morally evil acts not to the First Principle which is complete (tām) and full good (hayr), but to agents in the cause-effect chain. In summary, according to both teologians and philosophers, the ultimate source of human acts is the divine will and power. The acts that are morally or religiously evil, are not independent of man’s will. Thus, human beings are accountable for their actions. Philosophers and teologians, who agree on these issues, have explained their views and build their opinions on different concepts and principles. They have shown a very different attitude in their discourse and secondary principles, while all of them basically try to express the same idea. This difference has revealed within the frame of the following questions: Is man’s accountability for his actions because of his created power or will? Can evil actions, which are willed by human beings and therefore created by God, attributed to Him? Does the fact that the world emanates from God, the First Principle, due to His knowledge and essence, necessitate Him to be a willless and ineffective agent, and therefore to be a cause cause that has no effect on man's actions?Although teologians and philosophers have put forward different views in the context of the answers to these questions, they agree on the issues we have mentioned above. As this study shows, there is actually a common purpose in this subject, man’s actions, which causes deep divisions between theologians and philosophers in Islamic history. Primary sources of the study are the basic texts of the schools mentioned above. Additionally, the study were limited to the subject the effect of human on acts. It consists of two parts: the main part and the conclusion part. In the main section, the approaches of schools were examined from two aspects, in in terms of divine attribute and human effectiveness, and in the conclusion section, the common purposes behind the discussions were determined. (shrink)

Güzellik ve sanat iç içe geçmiş iki kavramdır. Bir bakıma güzellik, sanatın özüdür denilebilir. Her sanat dalında olduğu gibi hat sanatında da güzeli arama arzusu ve eşsiz eserler ortaya koyma çabası, hattatları sabırla çalışmaya ve kendi sınırlarını zorlamaya sevk etmiştir. Bir kitap sanatı olan hüsn-i hattın kelime manasının “güzel yazı” olmasına mukabil, daha iyisini yazmak uğruna harcanan çaba yorucu ve zahmetlidir, ancak sabırla çalışan elbette ki karşılığını alır. Başka bir deyişle “Muhakkak ki Allah güzeldir, güzeli sever!” hadis-i şerifi ışığında bu (...) sanata gönül verenler, yazıyı daha muntazam yazma hususunda büyük ölçüde gayret gösterirler. Kişinin muntazam yazmayı başarması ise, sistematik çalışmasına bağlıdır. Yazıyı kaidelerine uygun ve ölçülü yazabilmek bıkmadan usanmadan, karamsarlığa kapılmadan çalışmakla mümkündür. Bu sebeple gerek öğrenme aşamasında ve gerekse sonrasında, harfler defalarca çalışma kâğıdına yazılarak el melekesi artırılır. Kelimeler ve harfler kâğıda kimi zaman noktalanıp ölçülendirilerek, kimi zaman da noktalanmadan yazılır. Talim amaçlı yapılan bu çalışmalar, başka bir deyişle karalamalar, hat sanatının temeli niteliğindedir. Arap alfabesiyle yazılan ve “karalama” adı verilen el alıştırmaları yazıyla uğraşan kişinin o an irticalen elinden çıkan harf veya kelimelerden oluşur ve çoğu zaman bir anlam ifade etmez. Bu çalışmanın amacı, karalamaların estetik unsurlarını ele almak ve zaman içerisinde uğradığı değişime mercek tutmaktır. Hattatların bu özgür yorumları gün geçtikçe daha fazla önemsenmekte ve hayranlık uyandırmaktadır. Harf bünyesini oluşturan kaidelerin dışında satır ve sınırlara bağlı kalmadan yazılan bu yazılar kendi içinde bir kompozisyon oluşturmakta ve çoğu zaman yazan kişiyi dahi hayrete düşürecek özgün çalışmalar ortaya çıkabilmektedir. (shrink)

The text of “The Four Premises” (Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a), which began with Sadr al-Sharī‘ah (d. 747/1346), centralizes on the actions of human beings by connecting it with the problem of good and evil in the field of kalām, Islamic philosophy and logic, and fıqh. It was also commented in with incisive and critical footness by Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 791/1390). In Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a, al-Kastalī (d. 901/1496) discusses the two main issues. One of them is good/husn-evil/qubh, the other is (...) human actions. Good-evil dichotomy here is axiological, whereas the human actions are examined within an ontological structure. The quest for the origin of moral values is a husn-qubh debate. Identifying the hierarchy of human actions in ontology is another problem. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the theological discussions in the Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a which were written following the order of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror/Fatih. This text addresses the origin of moral judgment and the question of freedom and destiny in human actions linked to the problem of good and evil. Discussing these two fundamental issues, has made it necessary to thoroughly investigate perhaps all the subheadings which concern the entire paradigm that falls under the framework of understanding the God, nature, and humanity. By looking at the treatise, the main sources of the issues being discussed are mostly generated from an Islamic jurisprudence works, entitled Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ. It can easily be discerned that the direct quotations that were made or taken indirectly were from these two sources. References to other sources were quite seldom. However, the excerpts that were taken from primary sources were interpreted and expounded by the author and amended anew. In this article al-Kastalī’s comments will be analyzed. He’s work Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a will be analyzed in depth and will be published for the first time with a critical edition. Text of Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a is a product of a culture of criticism and critical thinking has two foundations: Disproval and verification. Critical thinking is then bidirectional. It is wrong to carry out the criticism activity in only one direction. It is insufficient to simply refute the opposing idea. It is not enough to show the wrong. The so-called right idea also needs to be justified. In the Tawdīh, Sadr al-Sharī‘ah criticizes al-Ashʿarī in the issues of husn-qubh and human actions. According to this criticism, good and evil should be based on the reason. On the other hand, human is free in his actions. As it is known, goodness and badness was based on religion according to al-Ashʿarī. Acquisition (kasb) given to man was unclear. It is al-Taftāzānī who wrote an annotation on Tawḍīḥ with the name of Talwīḥ. He’s comments are successful in terms of theology. However, these interpretations do not mean that he accepted the Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a. In terms of al-Taftāzānī, proofs of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah is weak. The theological disputes in Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ have reached the level of tension in the following works. The origins of the divergence are based on the differentiation between the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. In fact, these schools are not different from each other in terms of the method they use. Although the roads walked were the same, the results achieved were different. The main reason for this is that the issue is ambiguous and the problem of good and evil is multidimensional. It is directly related to God and human. It is also connected with ontology and epistemology together. The position on the husn-qubh issue is also decisive for other theological problems. The root of the evil problem or theodicy is mostly based on this problem in Islamic thought. The actions of God and human are questioned here. The value judgments that actions will take are examined. Which action is more moral and better? Another major problem discussed in this article is human actions. It is a matter of freedom of human volition. The volition of man before the absolute God is a problem. Because God has absolute power, will and knowledge. On the other hand, God imposes responsibility on man. But what are the limits of this responsibility? Al-Kastalī discusses all these problems in the context of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah and al-Taftāzānī. In the big picture there are representatives of the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. Al-Kastalī doesn’t paint a new picture, rather makes the lines in the picture clear. In this article, the texts will be analyzed mutually. The content and uses of the concepts will be given importance. Ideas will be discussed from their main sources and the roots and different reach of the issues will be touched. The interactions of different schools of thought will also be included. (shrink)

This article descriptively discusses the divine purpose in the creation of the world and especially the human being, and the value analysis of the concepts, expressing this purpose in the light of the views of Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024), who was from the Basra School, and systemized the five doctrinal principles of the Mu'tazila. Accordingly, it answers the question why God created the human on the basis of the purpose/aim in divine actions and examines the qualitative value of the (...) non-compulsory cause (dā’ī) that motivates God to create. In addition, the article shows that 'beneficence', the central concept in the purpose of the creation, is formulized as ‘tafaḍḍul’ (disinterested or gratuitous beneficence) with the title of wisdom before the creation and as ‘thawāb’ (reward) and ‘iwaḍ (compensation) with the title of wājib (necessary or obligatory) in the resurrection. It also emphasizes that ‘iqāb (punishment) is not a value for the beginning of creation, and therefore it is 'legal good' required by the resurrection. It also touches on that the concepts, expressing all this purposefulness are based on the values of 'benefit and good' (maṣlaḥa and ḥusn). This article concludes that while the main purpose of the beginning of creation is beneficence and its actual value is tafaḍḍul; the main purpose of re-creation is benefit and good, and the actual value is wājib. (shrink)

Mezar yapımı insanlık tarihi kadar eskidir. İlk insandan beri var olan bu yapı, her toplumun kendi gelenek ve inançları doğrultusunda farklı şekillerde tezahür etmiştir. Bu çalışma Türklerin tarih boyunca insana vermiş oldukları değerin bir göstergesi olarak mezar taşı kültürünün son dönem uygulamaları hakkında bilgi vermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla 19. yüzyıl ve sonrası Osmanlılarda mezar taşlarının almış olduğu şekilsel değişimler ve hüsn-i hattın uygulama biçimleri örnekler üzerinden verilmiş, araştırmaya konu olan yüzyılı temsilen iki mezar taşı detaylı incelenmiştir. Çalışmanın problem durumu “Yazı mezar (...) taşlarında ne zaman kullanılmaya başlandı? İstifli yazılar mezar taşlarında neden kullanılmıştır? İstifli yazıların zirve uygulamaları hangi dönemde olmuştur?” şeklinde tespit edilmiştir. Çalışmamızda nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden kaynak tarama, örnekleme, karşılaştırma, kaynak göstermeye başvurulmuştur. Çalışma hat sanatının en güzel uygulama alanlarından biri olan mezar taşı kitabetindeki yerinin görülmesi ve tarihi seyrinin öğrenilmesi açısından önemli olduğu söylenebilir. (shrink)

The subject “rule”, which is one of the most fundamental issues of the Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh), has been in the center of methodological debates. There is one important term in this regard, which should be studied very carefully: Khiṭāb(speech) of the God. It is because that, especially since the first period of Islam, it has been taken with some significant terms in the field of Kalāmsuch as Husn (pretty; good), Qubh (ugly; evil), and the quality of God’s (...) talk. Yet, adopting this term in the description of the “rule” shows that Fiqh is based on divine inspiration, and it also emphasizes that even though there are some differences in details, wisdom of human being is not ignored when adjudicating. Moreover, it suggests that the validity or methodological accuracy of the “rule” which is adjudicated with ruling case is related to the connection through the term speech or divine inspiration. In this regard, Kalāmdimension of the term and its affect to legal theoretical discussions are very important in terms of historical process of the definition of the “rule” in Islamic law. In this study, I tried to examine whether or not the term “khiṭābof the God” which is used in the definition of the “rule” formed a limitation for consideration of legal evidence in Islamic law and if there is any limitation for the legal evidence regarding being only in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah due to this definition.SummaryThe “hukm (rule, arbritation, judgment, God’s will)”-as the backbone notion in usūl al-fiqhis one of the significant key notions discussed in the legal theory. Specifically, the term “khitabullah” mentioned in the definition of hukmis noteworthy to investigate. Since the early formation period of Islamic law, the term khitabullahhas been embraced along with the theological subjects: “husnand qubuh(the good and evil) and kalām(the attribute of speech to Allah)”. The term “khitabullah” in the definition of hukmemphasizes that indeed the source of fiqhis the revelation (wahy) and also emphasizes that the function of reason (‘aql) is not ignored in the process of adjudication- even if there are some nuances in details.Additionally, it presents that the validity or methodological accuracy of the “rule” which is adjudicated with ruling a case is connected to the term speech (khitāb), or in other words to revelation (wahy).On the whole, in the legal theory, the rule of Sharī‘ah is defined as God’s khitab(the communication of God), which means the demand of God relating to the acts of those who are subject of law or the effect of the khitābon the acts of those persons. Although, in the early formative period various explanations were made about what the rule is, it can be understood that the present definition of hukmbegan to evolve towards the end of the 5thcentury (A. H.). It is clear that al-Ghazālī had an impact on the formation of this definition. It is because al-Ghazālī defined the rule of Sharī‘ahas “the communication from God relating to an act of the person who is the subject of law”. After al-Ghazālī, al-Rādī and al-Baydāwī added to al-Ghazālī’s definition the words “iqtidā and takhyīr” and Ibn Hājib added “wad‘an”. Whereas in the Mutakallimun(theologians) tradition, Ibn Hacib's definition was preferred, Fuqaha(jurists) tradition chose two definitions-resembling each other: “Those coming to exist with the khitāb” and “the effect of God’s khitāb”.Along with al-Ghazālī’s definition, the concept of khitābcarved out a niche for itself in it and became the main element of the definition. It is understood that some discussions in the field of theology, such as husn-qubhand God’s attribute of speech have been effective on the interpretation of the concept of khitāb. The Ash‘arilegal theorists argue that the good and evil are not attributes of the self / the acts, whereas the Maturidi legal theorists argue that the exploration and determination of these attributes is rational and thus, the verdict reached via this rationale is lawful. The Maturidi legal theorists initiated the concept of being subject of law with the concept Sharī‘ah and in the line with this opinion; they defined hukmon the basis of khitāb. On the other hand, the Mutazilites’ claiming the attribute of good and evil are inherent feature of the act, did not define hukmon the basis of the khitābaccording to their theological understanding. The word of khitābassessed with God’s eternal speech (al-kalām al-azalī) has been approached from various aspects: for instance, whether the presence of the addressee is mandatory. The early Asharites scholars (mutaqaddimun), in particular Imam Asharī, did not entitle the eternal speech as khitāb. They consider that the presence of the interlocutor is necessary in the conversion of Kalāminto khitāb. The mutaakhirunAsharites (successors of the early Asharites scholars) did not consider the presence of the interlocutor necessary, thus they viewed the eternal speech as khitāb. The former identification of the hukmwith khitābby the early Ashari legal theorists caused to the problem of whether hukmis adventitious or not. Therefore, this approach was criticised by the Mutazilites. On the other hand, the Maturidi and Mutezilite legal theorists accept that hukmis adventitious; hence they do not consider as a problem naming the eternal speech of God as khitāb.When the historical course is examined, it can be said that one of the important aspects of the development of hukm’s definition is the use of khitāb. Khitābin some cases is used without possessive construction, in other cases it is used with possessive construction with God, or in possessive construction with shar’ or Shāri’. The most important one within these possessive constructions is the notion “khitaballah”. Therefore, it is necessary for khitaballahto be approached from the angle of the legal theory. In comparison to other terms, this notion narrowed the scope of the rule down. In the meanwhile, it raised the question: how the rule deduced via legal evidences can be incorporated in khitāb? As a consequence of this question, some legal theorists, such as Tūfī, proposed another definition by adducing this question.Although it is commonly accepted that the rules deduced via other evidences are within the context of the khitāb, there are also different descriptions about the concept of khitaballah. The rule is not limited to khitaballahin the conception of traditional interpretation accepting the khitābas eternal speech or literal speech (al-kalām al-lafzī). Because either all evidences are within the context of the khitāb,which is the eternal speech or other evidences are within the context of the khitāb,which is the literal speech. Thus, each result coming to exist with the other evidences is part of the Islamic law. But not all of these rules are considered equal to each other. Because each rule which is deduced from indisputable origin (qatii al-thubut) and is deduced from completely explicit sources (qatii al-dalala) are accepted as the word of God or the Prophet. On the other hand, other rules deduced via jurisprudence- in other words by jurist’s own value of judgment is viewed as the virtual rule (al-hukm al-zāhir). Such rules do not express absolute certainty. It is unacceptable for these rules to be described as the word of God or the Prophet. In this way, it is clearly understood that the concept of khitaballahmentioned in the description do not introduce restriction to the evidences ofSharī‘ah.We do not see a contradiction when the indefinite rules of Islamic law included in the context of khitāb. Because ijtihāddoes not aim to produce a new rule, on the contrary it functions in order to find out the already existing rules. The legitimacy of the rule obtained through ijtihādemerges from the way that this rule is deduced from the khitāb,which directly or indirectly represents the divine will. In addition, according to us, this legitimacy is not merely limited to versification and conception of the khitāb, but it also includes the function of the reason in (reasonable of the) khitāb. As a matter of fact, trying to solve unlimited cases with limited texts is difficult- in fact this is impossible. The majority of the legal theorists also share this opinion. Then, there is no obstacle in accepting that each rule obtained by authentic source and methodology can be considered part of Islamic law by implicating the rule in the context of khitāb(which represents the divine will) - although it may contain error and presumption. (shrink)

Özet Şii-İmamiyye’nin usûlde Mu’tezilenin etkisinde kaldığı iddiaları, hicri dördüncü asırdan itibaren dile getirilmektedir. Buna karşılık usûlî düşüncenin ilk mümessili sayılan Şeyh Müfîd’den itibaren mezhep içinden yükselen sesler bu iddiaları şiddetle reddetmişlerdir. Biz bu çalışmada Mu’tezile kelamına sistematik hüviyet kazandıran ve yazdığı eserlerle Mu’tezile kelamının bugüne ulaşmasında büyük pay sahibi olan Kâdî Abdülcebbâr ile İmamiyye’nin kelam düşüncesinin istikrar bulmasında ve Şeyh Müfîd’le başlatılan usûlî yaklaşımın benimsenip yaygınlaşmasında büyük bir yeri olan Ebû Ca’fer et-Tûsî arasında adalet ilkesi üzerinden bir karşılaştırma yaparak, söz (...) konusu iddiaların ne kadar sübut bulduğunu tespit etmeye çalıştık. Kısmi farklı izahları bir kenara bırakırsak, adalet ilkesinin ispat ve yorumlanmasında iki kelamcı arasında kayda değer bir farklılığın olmadığı görülmektedir. Abstract The claim that the Shi’i Imamite thought is heavily influenced by the Mu’tazilite outlook has been alleged since the fouth century of hijra. However, beginning with Shaikh Mufid, the first representative of the Usuli branch of Shi’a, the Shi’is vehemently denied this allegation. In this article, this issue is dealt with by making a comparison between the idea of Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, the prominent Mu’tazilite scholar who made a major contribution to the consolidation of the schools’ theaching and that of al-Tusi, who also made a contrubitued to the integration of the Shi’ite kalam and the spreading of the usuli approach initiated by Shaikh Mufid. Leaving aside the differences in deatil, it seems that there is no noteworthy difference between their approcah to the issue of justice. Key Words: Qâdî Abd al-Jabbâr, Abû Ja’far al-Tûsî, Husn-Qubh, Divine Justice, Free Will. (shrink)

Eşʿarîliğin son aşamasını temsil eden Îcî’nin argümanları, ekoldeki geleneksel ve felsefî yaklaşımları yansıtmaktadır. Bu makale Îcî’nin Muʿtezile’nin ahlâkî realizmine karşı kullandığı temel argümanlarını sunmaktadır. Çalışmanın amacı Îcî’nin argümanlarını değiştirmeden sağlam bir şekilde sunmak, açıklamak, itirazları tartışmak ve sonunda güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini değerlendirmektir. Makalenin amacı Muʿtezile’nin argümanlarını açıklamak değildir; yine de Îcî’nin argümanlarını daha net anlamak için bazı açıklamalar yapmaktadır. Makalenin ilk kısmında Eşʿarîler ile Muʿtezile’nin ahlâk anlayışları arasında belirgin bir çizgi çizmektedir. Tartışma noktasını belirtip kelâmî argümanlar için zemin hazırlamaktadır. (...) Îcî’nin argümanları üç kısma ayrılmıştır. Birinci kısımda Îcî’nin Muʿtezile’nin ahlâkî temellerine şüphe düşürmek için insanın seçme özgürlüğünü ortadan kaldırmak için polemik argümanını sunmaktayız. Argümana karşı eleştirileri tartıştıktan sonra Îcî’nin insanın gücü ve seçme özgürlüğü konusundaki gerçek görüşünü ortaya koyuyoruz. İkinci kısım, intrinsik değerler görüşüne karşı üç argüman ihtiva etmektedir. İlk iki argüman Îcî tarafından benimsenmiş, üçüncüsü ise genel bir şekilde diğer Eşʿarîlere atfetmiştir. Bu iki argüman yalanı ve doğruyu söylemenin intrinsik etik değerleriyle ilgilenmektedir, üçüncüsü ise Eşʿarîlerin meşhur: “Bir araz başka bir araz üzerinde konamaz” deyişine dayanmaktadır. Makalenin son kısmı, Îcî’nin Muʿtezile'nin ahlâkî vecihler teorisine karşı argümanını tartışmaya ayrılmıştır. Îcî’nin argümanını tartışmadan önce teori ve taraftarları hakkında yeterli bir açıklama yapılmıştır. Ayrıca Îcî’nin ve Muʿtezile’nin ilâhî ahlâk anlayışına dair kısa bir giriş, argümanın içinde tartışılmaktadır. Adalet ve hikmet gibi bazı ilahî nitelikler Eşʿarî ve Muʿtezile’nin bakış açılarından ele alınmaktadır. Sonuç olarak makale, Îcî’nin Muʿtezile’nin ahlâkî realizmine karşı argümanlarını açık ve net bir şekilde ortaya koymakta, itirazları sunup değerlendirmekte ve argümanların güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini göstermektedir. Son olarak, Eşʿarîlerin Muʿtezile’ye karşı ahlâkî argümanlarını daha etkili bir şekilde anlamak için bir çözüm önermektedir. (shrink)