5 found
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  1. Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
    For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don.
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  2.  57
    Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge.John Nicholas Williams - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):213-217.
    Foley and Turri have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these.
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  3. Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges.John Nicholas Williams - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):83-94.
    I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false.I will show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsuccessfully) to address, (...)
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    Logic, Doxastic.John Nicholas Williams - unknown
    Doxastic logic, beginning with Hintikka’s Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, studies relations between propositions about what we believe. Using ‘a’ as a proper name like ‘Ann’, ‘→’ for ‘if’ as opposed to material implication, propositional variables such as ‘p’, ‘q’ and ‘B’ to represent the two-place relation, ‘... believes that... ’.
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    Still Stuck on the Backward Clock.John Nicholas Williams - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):243-269.
    Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. In their latest defence of the truth-tracking theories, “Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock,” Fred Adams, John A. Barker and Murray Clarke try again to defend Nozick’s and Fred Dretske’s early analysis of propositional knowledge against Backward Clock. They allege failure of truth-adherence, mistakes on my part about methods, and appeal to charity, ‘equivocation,’ reliable methods and unfair internalism. I argue that these (...)
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