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Kevin Sharpe
St. Cloud State University
  1. Animalism and Person Essentialism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (1):53-72.
    Animalism is the view that human persons are human animals – biological organisms that belong to the species Homo sapiens. This paper concerns a family of modal objections to animalism based on the essentiality of personhood (persons and animals differ in their persistence conditions; psychological considerations are relevant for the persistence of persons, but not animals; persons, but not animals, are essentially psychological beings). Such arguments are typically used to support constitutionalism, animalism’s main neo-Lockean rival. The problem with such arguments (...)
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    Thomas Aquinas and Nonreductive Physicalism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:217-227.
    Eleonore Stump has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is consistent with a nonreductive physicalist approach to human psychology. Iargue that by examining Aquinas’s account of the subsistence of the rational soul we can see that Thomistic dualism is inconsistent with physicalism of every variety. Specifically, his reliance on the claim that the mind has an operation per se spells trouble for any physicalist interpretation. After offering Stump’s reading of Aquinas and her case for the supposed consistency with (...)
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    Structural Properties and Parthood.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):111-120.
    Structural properties are properties something has in virtue of its mereological structure in that they are properties whose instantiation by a particular involves the parts of the particular being propertied and related in the appropriate way. Most of the literature on structural properties has focused on problems that arise from the pairing of two assumptions: (1) structural properties are universals and (2) structural properties are, in some sense, composed of the properties they involve. Chief among these difficulties is David Lewis’ (...)
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    Thomas Aquinas and Nonreductive Physicalism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:217-227.
    Eleonore Stump has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is consistent with a nonreductive physicalist approach to human psychology. Iargue that by examining Aquinas’s account of the subsistence of the rational soul we can see that Thomistic dualism is inconsistent with physicalism of every variety. Specifically, his reliance on the claim that the mind has an operation per se spells trouble for any physicalist interpretation. After offering Stump’s reading of Aquinas and her case for the supposed consistency with (...)
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    Between Death and Resurrection: A Critical Response to Recent Catholic Debate Concerning the Intermediate State, by Stephen Yates.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (4):567-572.
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    Comments on Kevin Morris’ “The Exclusion Problem, Without the Exclusion Principle”.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (2):79-83.
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    The Incarnation, Soul-Free: Physicalism, Kind Membership, and the Incarnation.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2017 - Religious Studies 53 (1):117-131.
    Animalists, those who hold that human persons are identical to human animals, seem committed to holding that, in becoming incarnate, the Son of God became a human animal. Unsurprisingly, a number of philosophers have argued that this is impossible. In this paper, I consider several objections to an animalist account of the incarnation based on kind membership, viz. objections drawing on kind essentialism, constitution essentialism, and the persistence conditions of animals. After developing each objection in detail, I respond by drawing (...)
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