This paper addresses the question of the existence of corporate philanthropy. It proposes a framework for analysing corporate philanthropy along the dimensions of business/society interest and primary/secondary stakeholder focus. The framework is then applied in order to understand business involvement with the arts in the U.K. A unique dataset of 60 texts which describe different firms' involvement with the Arts is analysed using formal content analysis to uncover the motivations for business involvement. Cluster analysis is then used in order to (...) identify motivational groupings. Two broad types of involvement are identified – advertisers and legitimators. Only in one case of the 60 is there the potential to observe pure altruism. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it provides a clear framework to understand the motivations for corporate giving and applies this using empirical data. Secondly, this research finds little evidence, if at all, of corporate philanthropy in the context of firms giving to the Arts in the U.K. (shrink)

We examine how UK listed companies set executive pay, reviewing the implications of following best practice in corporate governance and examining how this can conflict with what shareholders and other stakeholders might perceive as good behaviour. We do this by considering current governance regulation in the light of interviews with protagonists in the debate, setting out the dilemmas faced by remuneration-setters, and showing how the processes they follow can lead to ethical conflicts.Current ‘best’ practice governing executive pay includes the use (...) of market benchmarks to determine salary and bonus levels, significant levels of performance-related pay, the desire for executives to hold equity in their companies, the disclosure of total shareholder return compared to an index, and a perceived need for conformity, in order to grant legitimacy to policies. Whilst each of these may in some circumstances lead to good practice, each has the potential to cause dysfunctional behaviour in executives. Overall, we conclude that although best practice might drive good executive behaviour that coincides with the company’s and key stakeholders’ objectives, there are many reasons why it should not. (shrink)

We examine how UK listed companies set executive pay, reviewing the implications of following best practice in corporate governance and examining how this can conflict with what shareholders and other stakeholders might perceive as good behaviour. We do this by considering current governance regulation in the light of interviews with protagonists in the debate, setting out the dilemmas faced by remuneration-setters, and showing how the processes they follow can lead to ethical conflicts. Current 'best' practice governing executive pay includes the (...) use of market benchmarks to determine salary and bonus levels, significant levels of performance-related pay, the desire for executives to hold equity in their companies, the disclosure of total shareholder return compared to an index, and a perceived need for conformity, in order to grant legitimacy to policies. Whilst each of these may in some circumstances lead to good practice, each has the potential to cause dysfunctional behaviour in executives. Overall, we conclude that although best practice might drive good executive behaviour that coincides with the company's and key stakeholders' objectives, there are many reasons why it should not. (shrink)

We examine how UK listed companies set executive pay, considering the implications of following best practice in corporate governance and how this canconflict with what stakeholders might perceive as good behaviour. We do this by presenting the results of 40 interviews with protagonists in the debate, setting out the dilemmas faced by remuneration-setters, and how the processes they follow can lead to ethical conflicts. Overall, we conclude that although best practice might drive good behaviour, it often does not.

We examine how UK listed companies set executive pay, considering the implications of following best practice in corporate governance and how this canconflict with what stakeholders might perceive as good behaviour. We do this by presenting the results of 40 interviews with protagonists in the debate, setting out the dilemmas faced by remuneration-setters, and how the processes they follow can lead to ethical conflicts. Overall, we conclude that although best practice might drive good behaviour, it often does not.

This paper presents findings from a literature review exploring the operationalisation issues for corporate responsibility performance and corporate responsibility performance measurement systems (CR-PMS). It concludes with a synthesis for the key comparative aspects of a CR-PMS and a traditional PMS in terms of the metric and systems perspective. In light of the sparse academic literature on the specific topic, this paper proposes a new categorical tool, the Ten Factor Framework for the design of CR-PMS, which has both academic and practitioner (...) applications. (shrink)

Based on an inductive study we analyse the role of the investor relations (IR) function in the light of rising investor concern about corporate social responsibility (CSR). The study draws on interviews with IR professionals in twenty firms. It highlights their awareness of CSR issues as well as their assessment of concern among mainstream investors and socially responsible investors (SRIs). From these findings we develop suggestions on how the IR function is moving from a mere “broadcasting” mode regarding CSR issues (...) into a much more interactive mode of relationship management. (shrink)