Logical form and logical analysis as the search for it have been introduced during the development of logic and analytical philosophy and are still widely considered as key tools or methods for the solution of philosophical puzzles. It is instructive to have a look at a criticism of these presupositions and I present Wittgenstein as the author who provides such a criticism. I present a development of his view of logical form which went from the thesis of the ineffability of (...) logical form to the denial of the meaningfulness of the notion of logical form as such. This refusal is linked to Wittgenstein’s abandonment of the idea of the language of pure experience. The method of philosophical therapies is presented as an alternative to logical analysis and this methodology is linked with Wittgenstein’s consideration of game and family resemblance. (shrink)

Logical pluralism as a thesis that more than one logic is correct seems very plausible for two basic reasons. First, there are so many logical systems on the market today. And it is unclear how we should decide which of them gets the logical rules right. On the other hand, logical monism as the opposite thesis still seems plausible, as well, because of normativity of logic. An approach which would manage to bring a synthesis of both logical pluralism and logical (...) monism is called for. I review the possible forms of logical pluralism and render them more plausible. I thus arrive at logical dynamism, a synthesis of various pluralisms and monism focused on how logic develops. (shrink)

Various attempts at demarcating logic were undertaken, many of them based on specific understanding of how logical knowledge is formal and not material. MacFarlane has persuasively shown that general idea of formality of logic can be understood in various ways. I take two of the accounts of formality, namely the requirement of conservativity and the requirement of schematicity of logical vocabulary, into consideration as promising candidates to make the all too unclear notion of formality more precise and study to what (...) degree they could be considered as either necessary or sufficient conditions for logicality of some piece of vocabulary. Finding both notion unsatisfactory, as they stand, I propose combining them and envisage a hierarchy of logicality of expressions of a given language. Such a hierarchy is complicated and not linear, yet still offers a valuable explication of both the range and pragmatic significance of logic, if we combine it with logical expressivism. (shrink)

Henri Bergson se za svého života těšil velké popularitě. Přes jistý ústup ze slávy jeho filosofie i v druhé polovině dvacátého století inspirovala např. Gillese Deleuze. Nicméně analytická filosofie Bergsonovi dosud mnoho pozornosti nevěnovala. Ačkoli na první pohled skutečně s analytickou filosofií nemá mnoho společného, najdeme v jeho díle některé myšlenky, které by si zasloužily, aby je analytická filosofie zhodnotila. Zaměříme se na Bergsonovo pojetí špatně položených otázek, které je v mnohém podobné pojetí logických pozitivistů. Dále navrhneme, v čem může (...) spočívat jeho přínos pro teorii pravidel a normativistickou teorii významu. Obě témata jsou zde především programaticky nastíněna, jejich hlubší rozpracování je úkol pro další práci. (shrink)

Inferentialism has brought important insights into the nature of meanings. It breaks with the representationalist tradition that sees meanings as constituted primarily by representing some extra-linguistic reality. Yet the break with tradition should be pursued further. Inferentialists still regard meanings as static, and they still do not entirely abandon the idea of fully determined meaning. Following Davidon’s ideas about meanings as constituted only in the course of a specific conversation, I propose a dynamic account of what meanings are. They are (...) described as entities belonging to the dynamic realm of Henri Bergson’s duration. The inhabitants of this realm live in constant movement and development which is more essential to them than the stages that this development goes through. My account brings about a rejection of the notion of the strict literal meaning and therewith also of the contrasting notions such as ambiguity. Meaning is understood as a dynamic entity that is characterized rather by its history than by its nature. (shrink)

Inferentialism has brought important insights into the nature of meanings. It breaks with the representationalist tradition that sees meanings as constituted primarily by representing some extra-linguistic reality. Yet the break with tradition should be pursued further. Inferentialists still regard meanings as static, and they still do not entirely abandon the idea of fully determined meaning. Following Davidon’s ideas about meanings as constituted only in the course of a specific conversation, I propose a dynamic account of what meanings are. They are (...) described as entities belonging to the dynamic realm of Henri Bergson’s duration. The inhabitants of this realm live in constant movement and development which is more essential to them than the stages that this development goes through. My account brings about a rejection of the notion of strict literal meaning and therewith also of the contrasting notions such as ambiguity. Meaning is understood as a dynamic entity that is characterized rather by its history than by its nature. (shrink)

Logical pluralism from historical perspective -The plurality of logics is understood as a challenge to seek a deeper understanding of the na- ture and import of logic. Two basic approaches to demarcation of logic are considered, the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic one. Investigation of the history which led to these two appraoches identifies the postion of logic in Kant's epistemology as crucial for the devel- opment. An analogical development from Kant's conception of geometry to the plurality of geometric theories leads (...) to a holistic view both of geometry and of logic. It furthermore proves essential to understand the pragmatic import of logic. Given the problems tied to the attempts to demarcate logic, inferentialism and logical expressivism are arrived at as jointly provid- ing the most appropriate account. These approaches are developed into a conception which stresses, in line with the historical perspective of the work, the ability of logic to develop. (shrink)

This volume of the Logica Yearbook series brings together articles presented at the annual international symposium Logica 2015, Hejnice, the Czech Republic. The articles range over mathematical and philosophical logic, history and philosophy of logic, and the analysis of natural language.

As the foundation of our rationality, logic has traditionally been considered fixed, stable and constant. This conception of the discipline has been challenged recently by the plurality of logics and in this book, Pavel Arazim extends the debate to offer a new view of logic as dynamic and without a definite, specific shape. The Problem of Plurality of Logics examines the origins of our standard view of logic alongside Kant's theories, the holistic view, the issue of logic's pragmatic significance and (...) Robert Brandom's logical expressivism. Arazim then draws on proof-theoretical approaches to present a convincing argument for a dynamic version of logical inferentialism, which opens space for a new freedom to modify our own logic. He explores the scope, possibilities and limits of this freedom in order to highlight the future paths logic could take, as a motivation for further research. Marking a departure from logical monism and also from the recent doctrine of logical pluralism in its various forms, this book addresses current debates concerning the expressive role of logic and contributes to a lively area of discussion in analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This volume of the Logica Yearbook series brings together articles presented at the annual international symposium Logica 2017, Hejnice, the Czech Republic. The articles range over mathematical and philosophical logic, history and philosophy of logic, and the analysis of natural language.