This article‘s point of departure is a proto-analysis that I have suggested of entering self-deception in acquiring a belief and an associated set of jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception that I have proposed. Partly with the aim of fleshing out an important member of the proposed set of conditions, I provide a sketch of my view about how selfdeception happens. I then return to the proposed set of jointly sufficient conditions and offer a pair of amendments.

Sartre’s commentary on bad faith is the starting-point for an exploration of self-deception: what it is not, what it is, and whether it’s always wrong. The proffered analysis of selfdeception parallels a certain theory of our experience of fiction. In essence, it is argued that the self-deceiver creates a kind of fiction in which he is a character, a fiction that he nonetheless believes to be real.

First the rationalist tradition and then the cognitive revolution put limits on the philosophy and social sciences with regard to the analysis of emotion, of irrationality in mental events and actions, to the reduction of our representations to conceptual elements, and so on. This fact caused an increasing interest in these topics. In this paper, we intend to claim the significant relations among these three issues: emotion, selfdeception and non-conceptual content, with two aims: i) to analyse the relation between (...) non-conceptual content of emotion and the phenomenon of self-deception; and ii) to explain how self-deception canbe overcome by the conceptualization of some non-conceptual elements of emotion. (shrink)

The way in which the theory of “group selection” was treated as a heresy in evolutionary biology during the latter part of the twentieth century is considered as itself being an emergent group phenomenon, and some possible reasons why this particular theory had to be repudiated by the dominant group are explored. Then the process of “heresy-hammering” in general is examined as a behavior that can block important feedback, allowing the group to engage in a form of collective selfdeception, (...) and is therefore judged to be epistemically irresponsible and potentially maladaptive in terms of the group’s long-term survival. Some possible methods of foiling this process—which seems to operate largely below the level of full conscious awareness—are proposed. (shrink)

There is a growing pro-emotional consensus in contemporary literature on the relationship between emotions and practical rationality. Its proponents argue that emotions exhibit the properties of strategically rational states, i.e. that they can positively influence the cognitive mechanism of rational deliberation and lead an individual to choose an action based on its practical utility. In this paper, we will analyse the main claims of this consensus and examine their plausibility in light of three critical objections to the strategic rationality thesis. (...) We will demonstrate that emotions, despite their tendency to trigger episodes of impulsivity and selfdeception, can rightly be described as strategically rational, with the caveat that proponents of the pro-emotional consensus must exercise caution when attempting to support their beliefs with the thesis of the modularity of emotions and the evolutionary explanations for their practical utility. (shrink)

I argue that both psychological and philosophical studies of selfdeception suffer from serious weaknesses, albeit different ones. On the one hand, psychologists often use varying and unreflective conceptions of selfdeception in their research. On the other hand, philosophers either ignore the necessity of paying attention to psychological research – or, if they do, they use empirical studies of human cognition and reasoning without realizing that theories and data are loaded with highly problematic assumptions. These weaknesses become centrally important (...) in discussions about whether selfdeception is a rational or irrational phenomenon. Both parties have tried to advance their views without clearly stating which normative theory of rationality they are committed to, and without explaining how this theory can be used to study or assess selfdeception. More thorough interdisciplinary work is required to overcome naive conceptions and onesided methodologies in the study of selfdeception. (shrink)

Rampant moral relativism is widely decried as the leading source of the degeneracy of modern life.1 Though I proudly count myself a relativist, I rather doubt that relativism has anything like the cultural influence that its most ardent critics fearfully attribute to it. Much of what gets criticized under the rubric of relativism is often really no such thing. Relativists need not be hedonists, egoists, nihilists or even moral skeptics. Moreover, when it comes to the upper reaches of our intellectual (...) culture, relativism is more often dismissed than defended.2 I don’t deny that in certain literary corners of academe, relativism retains a fashionable post-modern cache.3 But in more sober philosophical circles, the catalog of ills from which relativism is widely thought to suffer is impressive.4 When taken as a characterization of the nature of moral discourse and moral argument, relativism is often thought to be descriptively inadequate. Contra the relativist, we do not treat moral disputes as rationally irresolvable. We do not tolerate all alternative moral “codes” as equally valid. Relativism may be true of merely cultural norms or practices. But morality has a felt universality that makes it quite different in character from a system of merely cultural norms or practices. In the face of morally abhorrent practices, we don’t simply shrug our shoulders and say that while the relevant practices may be wrong for us, they are alright for them. Relativism is sometimes even said to be self-undermining. It makes the very thing it purports to explain – the possibility of rationally intractable disagreements – impossible in the first place. Partly because of its supposedly self-undermining character, relativism is sometimes accused of being a strictly incredible doctrine. Those who profess to be relativists must, if this is true, either be insincere, confused, or self-deceived. Though someone might well sincerely hold the mistaken second-order belief that she believes that she believes that relativism is true, no one, in his or her deepest heart of hearts, sincerely, non selfdeceptively and informedly believes that relativism is true.. (shrink)

Does self-deception constitute a threat to the distinguishing kind of rationality human beings enjoy? I propose a compromise between the deflationary solutions to the alleged puzzles selfdeception has long been taken to give rise to and some virtues of the competing account -namely, the intentionalist view. In order to fulfil the task, I argue as to precisely what is left to blame in self-deception once we have made sense of why intentionalism fails to capture the nature of the phenomenon.

El artículo compara el modo como Aristóteles explica que un cuerpo llegue a vivir o que una mente llegue a entender, con el esquema explicativo que emplea Wittgenstein para dar cuenta de problemas como éstos: ¿qué hace posible que el signo adquiera significado, o que una acción sea el seguimiento de una regla? El interés se centra en la lógica de la explicación, y el propósito no es establecer relaciones de influencia, sino explorar analogías formales, con el objetivo de arrojar (...) luz sobre algunos conceptos centrales del pensamiento maduro de Wittgenstein. (shrink)

‘Banality of evil’ was a concept introduced by Hannah Arendt in order to characterize a new form of wickedness embodied in people as Adolf Eichmann and others nazis criminals. Arendt thougt that this perverseness was very awey from the one of ‘radical evil’, a notion built by Kant and employed by Arendt herself in former works. This article seeks to point out that concepts of radical evil and banality of evil are closer than Arendt recognizes.