Two Councils dealt with the birth and rebirth of the Moscow Patriarchate: the general Council of Constantinople of 1593 and the local Council of Moscow in 1917. In the course of the discussions two speakers based their arguments in favor of the Russian Patriarchate on the authority of canons: they were the Patriarch of Alexandria Meletius Pigas and the archimandrite, later bishop and martyr, Hilarion Troitsky. Despite the common recourse to the most ancient and authoritative canonical (...) sources, the perspectives of the two speakers appear different. Meletius Pigas refers to the structure of the universal Church, that is to the number and order of the Patriarchal Sees, and he adapts all the legislation he quotes to this end. On the other hand, Hilarion Troitsky considers exclusively the particular Church and rather sees in those same canons the primary intent of safeguarding the ecclesiastical autonomy of local jurisdictions and, above all, the need for a Primacy in them. (shrink)

Cardinal Lubomir Husar stipulates the hiding of the project on the provision of the patriarchate of the UGCC by the fact that even its sounding, not to mention the implementation, provokes a "wave of protests" in the Vatican circles, because it says "the patriarchate of the UGCC will weaken the communion with the Successor of St. Apostle Peter, and hence - weaken the connection with the whole Catholic Church, "" will mean the creation of a nationalist colored Church (...) that will sow hatred against all others, "will become a" major obstacle to the unification of Christians in Ukraine ", will lead to" neglect of the rights of the Moscow the patriarchate, which considers Ukraine to be its canonical territory, "to the preservation of" uniticism ", which in our time was condemned as an inappropriate way to achieve unity among all Christians". (shrink)

I am reading an April 4 issue of the newspaper "Day" in an interview with the Director of the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate Anthony. It reminds me of a well-known Ukrainian national comparison: it is yorking like a scar on a skillet. The Bishop's questions sound clear: Does your Church condemn the aggression of Russia and its annexation of Crimea? Why did not you condemn the aggressive actions of Russia Your Moscow Patriarch Kirill? No answer. The (...) Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate or the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the mouth of its predecessors has clearly said: We have aggression against Muscovy, we condemn it. Even my fellow countryman, the Cherkasy eparch of the UOC MP Metropolitan Sofroni called Putin a bandit. And Bishop Antony spoke so much that the elephant could be wrapped up in his printed interview, but the conqueror of the invader still failed. Therefore, the authorities of the Orthodox Church of Moscow jurisdiction do not hear the Ukrainian people, which all are inclined to go to the ranks of the National Guard to defend our independence. Even I in my 77 agreed to this. (shrink)

Muscovites sing: "Everything that I have been traversed is all around me." In this way, they reveal the organic nature of their expansionist nature. This song is in line with the concept of the "Russian world", defended by the Moscow Patriarch Cyril. His "peace" should include all so-called "historical Russia".

Without some special sensations in Moscow, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church elected some three years ago Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad. Of the 702 delegates of the Local Council, 508 voted for him, and the entire Ukrainian delegation, which was about 27% of the voters, was considered by him. Contributed to the coming to power in the Church of this, as it is called in Moscow, "ecclesiastical tobacco-vodka billionaire" acquired authority as a second person of (...) the ROC, support of Russian power and controversy in the camp of opponents. In the days of Patriarchal localization, Cyril managed to propyate himself in various forms and at different ends of the Moscow Church, to use television and radio for this purpose. The election campaign was conducted according to all the rules of modern technology. (shrink)

Using a religious studies methodology, this paper offers a detailed contextual mapping and a structural configuration of how collective violence is justified in Orthodox Christianity. The research design is explanatory, whereby the functional perspectives of doctrine, ethics and worship are all investigated and probed as phenomena of lived religion and orthopraxy. While predominantly initiatory and pedagogical, the paper also proposes a systematic platform for advanced research on this subject, by flagging contexts, themes and areas of inquiry that a researcher might (...) examine in order to untangle the inner workings of the justification of violence in the mind of the Orthodox. Given the ongoing Russian War on Ukraine, relevant samples are drawn from this case.Contribution: This paper outlines the Orthodox Christian justification of violence from the perspectives of doctrine, ethics and ritual and identifies pivotal areas of ambiguity between orthodoxy and orthopraxy. (shrink)

The paper deals withy the analysis and highlighting the concepts of First and third Rome under the context of the «Russian world» ideology and modern Vatican verification. The imperian segment of First and third Rome, interconnection between the ideologeme «Moscow – the Third Rome» and geopolitical in the essence concept of Kyryll patriarch. The process of historial fails of «Moscow the Third Rome» created for all the Christian world. It has been pinted out that the «Russian world» abd (...) the ROC were designated only for Eastern Slavonic countries of Europe. (shrink)

The paper deals withy the analysis and highlighting the concepts of First and third Rome under the context of the «Russian world» ideology and modern Vatican verification. The imperian segment of First and third Rome, interconnection between the ideologeme «Moscow – the Third Rome» and geopolitical in the essence concept of Kyryll patriarch. The process of historial fails of «Moscow the Third Rome» created for all the Christian world. It has been pinted out that the «Russian world» abd (...) the ROC were designated only for Eastern Slavonic countries of Europe. (shrink)

The Vatican probably hoped that the visit of the apostolic nuncio Claudio Gugerotti on December 16-18, 2016 to the occupied territories of the Donbas Ukrainian society "swallowing" was just as easy as it easily "swallowed" the same and his Easter visit, as the "swallowed up" meeting on June 10, 2015 by Pope Roman Francis with the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, in which many saw the obvious anti-Ukrainian context, not to mention here the anti-Ukrainian gesture that the Pope (...) had made by signing on February 12, 2016 The shameful "Havana Declaration", p Vatican which essentially gives Ukraine at the mercy of Moscow, since it recognizes domain of the Moscow Patriarchate. However, one should pay tribute to those who, seeing the pro-Moscow line of conduct of the Vatican, in particular its current head, Pope Francis, aspire to persuade Ukrainian society, first and foremost, of Ukrainian Roman and Greek Catholics, which, they say, only in this way the Holy See and can prove that he "loves Ukraine", but simply needs to have the ability to "read," "listen," to "look at the world through the eyes of God the Creator," as the Pope teaches. (shrink)

The paper looks into the phenomenon of criticism of the Russian World concept in contemporary Ukrainian religious, political and social discourses. It is shown that the propagandistic ideological narrative model, developed according to numerous historical analogs, is becoming a subject of critical analysis by specialists in many scientific areas. Experts' views coincide in many respects but there are also different stances on some disputable issues. The historical aspiration of Russia for domination and substantiation of its unique nature is considered the (...) root of the concept. This explains the use of such narrative constructs as "Moscow is the third Rome", "specific civilization" etc. Based on evidence of competent authorities, the author proves that the concept was most likely developed by a group of leading Russian ideologists in the late 20th century. It acquired the modern conservative and nationalist form only after it had become an object of interest of Russian clerical circles and started spreading through church resources. The symbolic figure in this respect is the current Moscow Patriarch Kyrylo who has been an active promoter of the Russian World concept from the early 21st century. After he had been voted into the Patriarch office, Kyrylo turned the Russian World into the leading church and political narrative. The wide use of the concept for political purposes was consistently criticized for undisguised militarism, aggressive and nationalistic ideas underpinning the Russian World. According to numerous experts, these ideas have no common root with Christianity, sometimes being in open contradiction with the latter. Critical studies also indicate that the basis of the Russian World is the belief that the Russian culture and language are culturally superior to historical achievements of numerous other peoples, including the Ukrainians. As historical experience shows, the use of such ideological concepts as the Russian World results in consolidation of society around one national idea and expansion of aggressive state policy to neighboring countries. (shrink)

The fall of the socialist system in the early 90's of the twentieth century. led to the return of the Orthodox Churches of Europe to the active social and political life of the post-Soviet countries. Therefore, the adoption in August 2000 by the Jubilee Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church of the social doctrine became a necessary stage in the development of Russian Orthodoxy, and at the same time marked the beginning of a new time of not only this (...) Church, but the whole Ecumenical Orthodoxy. However, this serious doctrine did not cause any serious attention, except for one or two colloquiums organized by the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate. The wave of theological and non-fiction works on the hot topics raised in the Doctrine also did not happen to the experts. (shrink)

Summary. The article deals with the close link between the diminishing influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on social and political processes in Ukraine and the restoration of the Ukrainian cultural and civilizational space. Namely, the gradual deprivation of Orthodox believers of the post-imperial syndrome, including attitudes, perceptions, behavioral models, etc., associated with the stay of Ukrainians in the foreign-language and other people's mentality and culture of the empire. It is noted that the receipt of the Tomos on recognition (...) of autocephaly and the constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine by Orthodox believers of Ukraine has a positive impact not only on the development of the OCU itself, but also the level of patriotism, restoration and development of the Ukrainian-speaking environment, archetypal traditions, rituals, behavior models, etc. The conclusion is about the religious aspect of promoting Ukrainian development from the Asian to the European cultural and civilizational model. (shrink)

The attainment of autocephaly by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine intensified the religious transitions of parishes that were preceded by individual parishioners’ switches. The highest dynamics of such transitions occurred in the Volyn Region in the north-western part of Ukraine. These transitions refer exclusively to a switch from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine without affecting other religious communities. Most of the population supported the autocephalous status of the Orthodox Church (...) of Ukraine, for they consider granting autocephaly as a major historical event for the Ukrainian nation. The process of active religious transitions was primarily determined by the aptness of each parish community and political climate on a national level. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine was able to maintain its high regard, but with the change of political power in Ukraine in 2019, it lost political support. The process of religious transitions dwindled. (shrink)

An important moment in the recent history of the Eastern Orthodox Church was for sure the recognition granted to the Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople with the Tomos of autocephaly. Praised by some Orthodox churches and damned by other, it was preceded by some attempts of negotiation initiated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and by a few meetings between the representatives of the aforementioned institution, Russian Patriarchate and the Ukrainian local churches that was later recognised (...) by Constantinople and by a Schism between the Constantinople and Moscow. At the same time, it divided the local Orthodox churches between the ones who sustain one or the other side or prefer to remain in a neutral state and determined later meetings like the one from Amman in Jordan, between leaders and representatives of the Orthodox Church. Conscious of the relevance of the event and its potential consequences, we have tried here to see how it was reflected in the ecumenical space. Therefore, we have proceeded to the investigation of the journals from the ecumenical area that spoke about it, and we analysed the way how they saw it and emphasised the main elements that have raised their interest. Together with the ecclesiastical challenges, we found that they were also interested in this problem not only for its theological meaning but also because of its geopolitical relevance. The research, based on the literature investigated, therefore presents the Ukrainian problem and its image in the ecumenical space.Contribution: The research investigates how the image of the Eastern Orthodox Church changed in the ecumenical space after the foundation of the New Ukrainian Church and the debates that followed inside of the Orthodox space in this context. It is linked with the scope of the journal due to the fact that investigates a topic relevant for the ecumenical area and presents a topic that can contribute in the future to the change of the relationships with different churches with the Orthodox one. (shrink)

The article explores the semantic potential of social narratives associated with the creation and constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which caused a interpretations conflict, marked by conflicting interpretations and differences in meanings that are applied in different contexts. The narrative arranges events in a certain time sequence, accumulates and translates meanings, individual and social experience. The presence of meanings in the interpretation of the narrative depends on the perspective, interpretation horizons and the subject's ability to analyze information and (...) its correct application. The social narrative accumulates a set of stories and messages that are fragmentary and disordered, constructs a coherent plot aimed at finding and defining meanings, and forming social discourse. Social narratives materialized in social structures, orientations, expectations, and stereotypes of their bearers due to everyday modification in the form of simple images, attitudes, and principles. Since each social narrative claims to be exclusive and correct in its own way of understanding events, a clash of narratives and their interpretations is inevitable. A large-scale event determines the modification of social structures, standards, and evaluation criteria, is accompanied by the transformation of everyday life, reveals deep mental layers, and opens up new perspectives. The extraordinary event that was marked by the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is accompanied by diametrically opposite assessments from the clergy, believers, politicians, experts – from the statement about autocephaly as the only opportunity to achieve unity and recognition of Ukrainian Orthodoxy to the political subtext justification of the new religious organization creation. Church circles represented by representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate claim that the state interferes in the internal Affairs of the Church. The Constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine takes place in the context of the confrontation of two social narratives – the «ukrainian world» and the «russian world». The social narrative «ukrainian world» is based on values rooted in the national soil, but the social narrative «russian world» denies the existence of the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian state. Under the patronage of the Russian Orthodox Church, the expression of the ideas of the «russian world» is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which enshrines in the minds of believers ideologies about «the common origin of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples», «the common baptismal font», «the unity of the historical space of Holy Rus», «the identity of the East Slavic Orthodox civilization». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate did not support the decision of patriarch Bartholomew to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Metropolitan Onufriy did not give his blessing to the hierarchs to participate in the Unification Council, which is called «a non-canonical assembly of schismatic groups». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, according to its primate, has de facto autocephaly, so it is the only canonical local Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In the face of the conflict of public narratives, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, along with meeting the spiritual needs of believers, contributes to the formation of national identity, the formation of a worldview matrix that will determine the vision of the future development of the country. (shrink)

The article by Alexander Soldatov contains a new view to solving the problem of autocephaly in the context of the desire of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine to the attainment of the autocephalous status. Analyzing the canon law, the statements of the Holy Fathers of the Orthodox Church and the historical experience of Orthodoxy, the author comes to the conclusion that there are two types of autocephaly in the Orthodox tradition - old and new one. These types are different in (...) the scope of authority of the church authorities and in the mode of origin. Author's concept is related to the ancient principle Pentarchy, i.e. the primacy in the Universal Orthodoxy five ancient patriarchates that are exclusive carriers autocephaly completeness. Only they, with certain reservations and limitations, have the right to grant autocephalous status of the other local Churches. The Moscow Patriarchate is not a member of Pentarchy, this right it does not have, which removes from the agenda the question of the very possibility of obtaining autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from Moscow. In this regard, the article addresses some lesser known aspects of "resubordination" of the Kyiv Metropolis to Moscow Patriarchate from Constantinople in the end of the XVIIth century. (shrink)

The issue of inter-denominational understanding has been relevant to Ukrainians for many centuries. During the discussions the idea of ​​proclaiming the Ukrainian patriarchate was crystallized. According to the clergy, this would resolve the existing inter-denominational contradictions. However, the problem has become more political than religious. The emergence of such a powerful structure in Ukraine was opposed by the Polish authorities and the Polish-Latin clergy, as well as by the Russian government and its Orthodox Church. For Catholic Poland and Orthodox (...) Moscow, the establishment of an independent church in Ukraine was associated with state formation and signified a sharpening of the Ukrainian issue. Therefore, depending on the political situation, work in this direction was suspended or, conversely, revived. (shrink)

This article analyzes Orthodox influence on developing national identity in modern Ukraine. The authors state that the factor of national specificity of Christianity is evident if we consider nations, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, Christianity influences the development of national cultures and has acquired the national characteristics of a particular community. Also, the war in Ukraine, which was started by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, has significantly impacted socio-cultural processes in Ukraine, the functioning of national (...) identity, and the religious situation, especially regarding the Orthodox churches. Authors pay attention to the reference to the topic of national identity in the documents and sermons of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to show how the Orthodox hierarchies treat these issues. In addition, they study the ideologies that the Russian Orthodox Church creates and tries to impose through the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church churches of the Moscow Patriarchate as a dominant cultural, religious, and political discourse. (shrink)

Since independence Ukraine has been in the zone of conflict with Russia in 1991. Russia can not accept the collapse of the Union, which allowed hundreds of other ethnic groups to be kept in a state of colonial enslavement. At the same time, she resorted to the use of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which is legally operating in Ukraine, in its anti-Ukrainian activities.

Saichō 最澄, one of the most prominent of Japanese Buddhist innovators, is the renowned ninth-century founder of the Tendai School, the first Japanese Buddhist sect with its own system of temples and monasteries, ordinations, practices and philosophy. It was in the goal of founding and maintaining an authentic Buddhist monastic institution that, for better or worse, influenced his thinking, and structured his philosophy. Although Saichō’s identity as founder is beyond dispute, this accomplishment was initially made possible through what we might (...) call modes of self-displacement, essentially establishing his legitimacy as founder by tracing the origins of Tendai beyond himself to founders even more prominent in the minds of his contemporaries. It is through our participation in this initial displacement of Saichō that the meaning of his contributions to Japanese Buddhism will begin to unfold. (shrink)

A series of seven epigrams from the Anthologia Marciana (MS Marc. gr. 524) sheds light on the life of John IX Merkouropoulos, patriarch of Jerusalem in exile (1157-before 1166). The evidence that comes to light reveals traces of a monastic network connecting Jerusalem with Constantinople. According to the epigrams, John became a monk at Mar Saba - something further evinced by the double vita of St John of Damascus and Kosmas of Maiouma that he composed [BHG 395]. After staying at (...) the Koutsovendis monastery, he travelled to Constantinople, where Manuel I appointed him on the patriarchal see and also made him abbot of the monastery of St Diomedes/New Zion in Constantinople. Shortly before or after John’s departure from life, his disciple, the monk Clement, attempted to manifest that his spiritual father was a holy man. Thus, Clement had John’s portrait placed next to that of St James, the brother of God. John’s complex relationship with the Syropalestinian monastic tradition make his life and the survival of his memory an exceprional case study for understanduing the phenomenon of Holy Men in twelfth-century Constantinople. (shrink)

Any study of the religious situation in Ukraine always faces one problem - the lack of detailed information on the number of believers of a particular denomination. The most recent census did not include the question of denominational affiliation, as it was considered a violation of the principle of freedom of conscience. The only officially recognized statistical unit we have is the religious community. Approximate number of adherents of a particular denomination is given by the results of sociological research. However, (...) it is precisely at the border of statistics and sociology that one of the paradoxes that the current religious situation in Ukraine is rich in is the paradox of the inconsistency of sociological data with statistics. Thus, according to the State Committee for National Religions of Ukraine as of January 1, 2009, there were 11539 communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, 4128 communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, and 1184 communities of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. As the traditional Greek churches include the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Roman Catholics, their number is 3570 and 907 communities, respectively. (shrink)

The last decade of the last century and the first years of the XXI century. proved to be quite significant both in the realm of Catholic-Orthodox dialogue in the context of the ecumenical concept, as well as in the interest of theological discussion on this subject in extracurricular Catholic circles, represented by the venerable profession of Catholic universities and the Jesuit and allied Jesuits. It should be noted immediately that in these discussions, the voices of Orthodox authorities, with the exception (...) of some clergy of the Eastern Orthodox patriarchates, play a rather modest role. The Moscow Patriarchate occasionally makes ironic replies regarding some of the statements made by Vatican diplomats and, most recently, the pontiff himself. Ukrainian Orthodoxy, divided and focused on intra-Ukrainian church problems, does not respond to the innovations that emerge from Catholic-Orthodox dialogue. (shrink)

: Undoubtedly, in the formation of history, relations between religious structures and political powers, which are shaped within certain principles, have an important place. The course of these relations determines the strength and domain of both sides. This form of relationship, in some cases, evolves in favor of political power, and sometimes manifests itself as a political direction of religious interests. It is possible to see politics as a direction of religion or to use it in the direction of its (...) own interests in the politics that the Soviet Union has implemented since the Second World War. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union, which has embraced the ideology of official atheism and struggled against religious beliefs, did not stop using religion/church for conjuration in its own interests. In this context, The Soviet leader Stalin has almost reconstructed the Russian Orthodox Church, which he had been trying to destroy since the early years of the Second World War. Even, Moscow has made serious attempts to make Patriarchate the pioneer of the Orthodox world. In this article, we aim to emphasize Stalin’s church politics and reasons. We will also stress the reasons behind the Council of the Orthodox Churches, which Stalin sought to achieve through the Moscow Patriarchate in 1947. Finally, we will touch on the policy of the Fener Greek Patriarch against these developments. Summary: Throughout history, politics of states have been under the influence of religion. Likewise, religions have directed political authority in the direction of their own interests. Sometimes a religion takes the state under its influence; sometimes under a state takes a religion under the influence and they try to use the other one in the interests of itself. Concepts that define religion-state relations have emerged under the influence of experiences experienced over time. Secularism is at the head of the concepts that determine religion-state relations today. What secularism is and how it is practiced is much debated in the scientific circles. Despite all these struggles, however, no binding definition has been reached for all political issues. Certainly, the subjective structure of states plays an important role in regulating religion-state relations. The political ideology adopted by this political structure and the world view varies. Sometimes political structures with official atheist ideology can break the principle of secularism. While these ideologies are ungodly in their nature, they benefit from political interests. As an example, it is possible to show the Soviet Union with an atheist ideology. Because the Soviet regime used religion in the direction of political interests between 1943-1948. The Russian Orthodox Church, which was very active and competent during the reign of Tsarist Russia, lost its power with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Soviet regime has made the Russian Orthodox Church an illegal institution. The struggle against the church by the regime continued until the Second World War. With the Second World War, Stalin's church politics changed. There is no doubt that this political change has become more than one reason. The first is that the state has entered into a war. Stalin did not want to continue the struggle with religion while the war was going on. Another reason for pushing Stalin for a policy change towards the Church is the anti-Soviet propaganda carried out by the Germans. As a matter of fact, the Germans defined themselves as the savior of the Russian people. It was also alleged that Germany was waging a war against the Soviets in order to free Russian people from communism. Even brochures were taken from the airplanes in this frame. The Germans aimed to break the resistance of the Russian people with this method. Stalin acted to ward off this propaganda of the Germans. Stalin therefore had to keep an eye on church politics and stopped the oppression against the church. In this framework, opportunities were provided for the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, have been approved to organize rites in churches. The priests are encouraged to strengthen hand the people. Also closed churches have been reopened by Stalin. In this way the German propaganda has been wasted. The Second World War ended with the victory of the Soviet Union. Stalin, however, continued to use the church after the war was over. So why did Stalin continue to support the church as an atheist? What were the reasons for pushing Stalin into this policy? Stalin's post-war church policy has multiple causes. The most important of these is spreading the Soviet influence over the entire Balkans and Middle East geography through the Russian Orthodox Church. Undoubtedly this is related to the long-term policies of the Soviets. Because the war has changed all the balances in the world. This has given new opportunities to the Soviets. At the beginning of these, the Orthodox world comes to the Soviet influence. It seems that the steps towards this have been started to be started from 1945. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church found important activities. For example, the Moscow Patriarch has established relations with other Orthodox Churches. Jerusalem, Athens, Cyprus, Antakya churches were visited. In the end, an attempt was made to collect the Orthodox Council. The struggle of the Western and Eastern bloc emerged after the Second World War divided the Orthodox world into two camps. In this process, the Greek, Cyprus and Jerusalem Orthodox churches under the leadership of the Fener Patriarchate were under American influence. The Serbian, Bulgarian and Antiochian Orthodox Churches under the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate were under Soviet influence. For these reasons, the Soviet regime, which has been fighting for the Church since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, has given up its position. It is understood from this historical fact that a regime adopting irreligion as an official ideology uses religion in its own interests as needed. This indicates that secularism is relative. This study will try to show how the Soviet Union uses the Russian Orthodox Church in its own interests despite the atheism ideology. (shrink)

The main purpose of the article is to highlight the content and logic of formation the concepts of the state that emerged among the Ukrainian Orthodox intellectuals in the end of XVI - early XVII century. During this period was decisive for the formation of early modern Ukrainian nation as a new community and the beginning of its struggle for statehood. Major political role in the formation of Ukrainian nation at that time played Cossacks, but the Orthodox clergy not only (...) gave ideological support Cossack, but had his own concept of nation. As the main creators of the concept were Meletius Smotrytsky, Zachariy Kopystensky, Jov Boretskiy, Petro Mohyla. His complete registration it has acquired at the time of the restoration of Orthodox Metropolis of Kyiv and the metropolitan of Petro Mohyla (1620-1646). The principal features of this concept is defined as follows: State Orthodox intellectuals understood as a voluntary association of people of all classes around one idea. This idea was determined public good that church leaders perceived primarily as a transcendent grace. The symbol of grace was heavenly Jerusalem, which advocated earthly projection Kyiv. Orthodox church leaders deliberately refused confession from the ideal state for aggressive ideal spiritual state. This identified a fundamental difference from the then existing state ideologies of the Rzeczpospolita and Moskovia. Ruler of the concept of the ideal state is determined Orthodox hierarchs not a person but a state, personified in its most charismatic spokespersons. At first, the prince, then the gentry, then the Cossacks. The main objective is the defense of the state governor and care about the welfare of his subjects. At the same time Ukrainian clerics fundamentally alien to the idea of autocracy, they differ greatly from contemporary Moscow clergy. Another important feature of the state concept Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Cossack era is persistent assertion priority of the spiritual over the secular government that does not coincide with the ideals of the Cossacks and was often a source of conflict. The main conclusions of the note is the fundamental notions of state formation in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the difference between these concepts from Moscow-Byzantine ideology and proximity to European humanistic model of the state than is largely due to the role of the Orthodox Church in the national liberation revolution led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and conflicts Kyiv Metropolis with the Moscow Patriarchate in the future. (shrink)

The article covers the development of the idea of ​​patriarchal status in 1945-1962 within the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the diaspora, focusing mainly on the third wave of Ukrainian emigration. After the Second World War, about 250,000 Ukrainian refugees found themselves in Western Europe, from where in 1947-1955, they moved to the countries of North and South America, Western Europe and Australia. The growing role of the Church, which continued to play a significant role in their lives after their (...) resettlement to the countries mentioned above, marked the experience of their stay in the DP camps. The DP camps became a place of a closer rapprochement between Ukrainian Greek Catholics and Orthodox Christians, one consequence of which was the appeals of a Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishops with a proposal to create a joint patriarchate with Ukrainian Orthodox, which would be in unity with Rome. On the other hand, the expansion of the geography of the presence of the UGCC and the founding of new metropolises in Canada and the United States brought to the fore the question of the unity of all structural units of this Church at the global level, which, as some believed, could have been secured by the patriarchal institution. Finally, the patriarchate was considered by the post-war Ukrainian emigration as a means of preserving the unity of the diaspora in the face of assimilation and disintegration. Furthermore, in the future, as an institution that could effectively help the Church revive at home after independence. The last aspect of the patriarchal idea had a significant impact on the emergence of the Ukrainian patriarchal movement, and its closeness to the goals set by the third wave of Ukrainian emigration provided that movement with a high level of massiveness and passionate vigorousness for the movement. (shrink)

The article offers to look at modern political processes through the prism of the participation of the religious factor in them. Considering the current Russian-Ukrainian war as a kind of trigger that launched global changes in the system of international relations, burying its previous bipolar model, the authors analyze the changes that have taken place in Ukraine, in its religious segment. Ukraine is turning from a little-known part of the world religious space into an active reformer of this space. At (...) a certain moment, it becomes the center of a global confrontation between three main religious points - Constantinople, Rome and Moscow, reformatting the usual Christian landscape of the world. The given quantitative and qualitative indicators of the presence of Ukraine as a religious entity in the European and world space demonstrate both its enrichment and problematic conflict. The war revealed latent inter-denominational confrontations in Ukraine and in the world. Such a powerful tool of ideological influence as religion/church is used by conflicting parties to justify and sanctify aggression and protect against it. The authors focus their attention on Ukrainian Orthodoxy, on its role in reformatting the religious space. Ukrainians put an end to the unlimited dominance of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ecumenical Orthodoxy, which affected other Christian communities. The absence of Ukraine in the geopolitical space, which lasted due to historical circumstances, has been overcome. Now it is subjectively present in the worldwide religious community and is there as an independent spiritual and organizational force that will only increase its potential. The former world security system has collapsed, and the old levers of restraining the aggressive and dangerous intentions of individual countries do not work. So, it is suggested to think about new forms of geopolitical coexistence. In the constructive solution of controversial issues, the human community must accumulate the efforts of all possible participators of the democratic alliance, including such a powerful religion, which over the millennia of its spiritual and practical activity has developed its own specific methods of peacemaking. (shrink)

In 1677, Georges Pierre des Clozets visited Robert Boyle and told him that he had been approved for membership in the Asterism, a secret international society of alchemical masters, headed by Pierre's patron Georges du Mesnillet, the Patriarch of Antioch. Extensive correspondence followed, replete with gifts and bizarre claims, until Pierre vanished in August 1678. This paper links several new documents—articles in the Mercure galant and the Gazette de France and a manuscript account by another convinced admirer of Pierre—to my (...) previous study of him, particularly in regard to Pierre's claim to be working with the Patriarch to reunite Eastern and Western Churches. Dating from before and after Boyle's involvement, these sources add fresh details about Pierre and his other contacts, and show the consistency of Pierre's stories and the credibility he fashioned as he travelled around Europe convincing people of his claims alchemical and otherwise. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 179-206.

In the XIV century. centripetal tendencies began to appear in the Moscow principality. Inside the Russian church, several areas were distinguished. Part of the clergy supported the specificobar form. The other understood the need for transformations in society. As a result, this led to a split in the Russian church in the 15th century for "non-possessors" and "Josephites". The former linked the fate of the future with the ideology of hesychasm and its moral transformation, while the latter sought support (...) in alliance with a strong secular power. (shrink)

In a span of twenty years, two of the autocephalous churches of the Orthodox Christian world released documents addressing the social realities of contemporary life: the Russian Orthodox Church's Basis of the Social Concept (2000) and the Ecumenical Patriarch's For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church (2020). This article offers a side-by-side comparison and analysis of the documents’ treatments of matters of birth and death, including childbirth, abortion, miscarriage, end-of-life care, euthanasia, suicide, and (...) a vision of a good death. Detailed comparison demonstrates remarkable accord between the two churches on many of these matters. Differences of omission and emphasis appear to be indicative of contrasting demographic and historical situations, with the exception of one, notable divergence between the churches, all of which are discussed. The striking degree and depth of consonance between the documents offers potential for cooperation and unity as the two churches negotiate their conflicts while also seeking to guide their flocks and offer Orthodox Christian witness in an increasingly desacralized world. (shrink)

The Brest Union is a church-historical event in 1596 and on this basis established an understanding between the Ukrainian-Belorussian Orthodox Church and the Roman Throne: the recognition of the Roman Pope as the head of the Church with all the conclusions of this confession in matters of faith, morals and church administration, with the preservation of administrative, ritual, disciplinary and, in general, ecclesiastical and cultural autonomy within the framework of the Kyiv Metropolitanate. The Turkish captivity of the Constantinople Patriarchate, (...) the complicated cases of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the dislocation of its internal discipline, the creation of the Moscow Patriarchate, which encroached on the whole of the European East, the Protestant influences and polonization of the upper classes of Ukraine caused the Ukrainian Church in the 2nd half of the XVI century century of deep crisis. (shrink)

In the article by M. Karpitsky "Repressions against Non-Moscow Orthodox Christians in the Donbass" on concrete facts it is shown how the persecution of separatists and with what motivation are found in the Donbass territory by the faithful of Protestant communities, the Churches of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Greek Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Church. It is talked about how they manage to survive in constant persecution and torture.

The article is devoted to the analysis of representations of the state which were part of the philosophical concept of the famous Ukrainian church leader, educator, philologist Yepyfanii Slavynetskyi. It was found that the historical and cultural context in which these views were formed, included deep familiarity with European philosophy, the theory of the state developed by the Orthodox intellectuals of Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium, the political struggle for the incipience of early modern Ukrainian nation in the second half of the XVII (...) century. Noted significant influence of the philosophy of E. Slavynetskyi on the religious, cultural and educational processes in Muscovy in era of Patriarch Nikon's reforms. The presence of the Patriarch own notions of state authority actively influence on the formation of the E. Slavinetsky's concept too. It is noted that E. Slavynetskyi's statesmanship theory was based on the developed by the Ukrainian Orthodox intellectuals of the end of XVI - first half XVII theory of the ideal state, which in the second half of the XVII century actively evolved due to the political union of the The Cossack Hetmanate and Moscow. Accordingly, E. Slavynetskyi recognized people's right to political activity and state power, the church was considered as a leader of social progress, obligement of the lord to care for the public good. It was found that the concept of E. Slavynetskyi's state have many elements of European theories of enlightened absolutism. Yes, he acknowledges that the foundation of the state is public good and providing the best way for implementation this good - monarchy, insisted on the absolute power of the monarch. The relationship between the church and secular authorities philosopher solves unambiguously in favor of a secular, acknowledging the king's right to decide all important issues of church life. It is noted that the main reason for the evolution of such ideas was given the fact of The Cossack Hetmanate's political union with Russia as the civilizational mission to improve the capacity of the Orthodox culture and building a just state. This theory has become its logical conclusion later in the XVIII century in F. Prokopovich's philosophical views and political activities. (shrink)

For several years, in some regions of Ukraine, attempts have been made to clericalise educational institutions, transfer them to a comprehensive school, and in some places - to higher educational institutions, an atmosphere of interfaith rivalry, inter-church confrontation, imposing not only a religious worldview on the one or our religion Moscow, or the Kyivan Patriarchate) or the Roman Catholic or Greek Catholic Church, but also certain socio-political and ideological-spiritual orientations and norms of behavior, which, in the first place, (...) znachayetsya the moral and psychological atmosphere of the children, on the one hand, and the relationship between teachers and students, parents of students and teachers of schools - the other. (shrink)

In our scientific reconnaissance we have repeatedly turned to the analysis of social and spiritual origins, features of the doctrine of religious association of the charismatic orientation of the Orthodox origin of the Leontians, the personality of Leontius, the activities of his followers. Again, the small work of the Archpriest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, Vasily Ostapchuk, entitled "The Life and Activity of Father Leonti", published in 500 in Rivne in 2006, forced us to (...) turn to the figure of Leonti, his teachings and activities. (shrink)

A great and significant church, our historic event is the event of the so-called Unity of our Church with the Universe. Thanks to her we accepted our Christianity and from which we separated, even not knowing when! For some reason there is no such date in the historical calendar of our people! Legally, we belonged to Constantinople, and then we fell under the Moscow Patriarchate, which still calls our return to the Ecumenical Church as a betrayal, apostasy, union (...) with heretics, and promise. Whom? From whom? How? (shrink)

This paper represents a critical analysis of Eastern Orthodox perspective on Human Rights in two important official documents issued by some of the most prominent patriarchates: Moscow and Constantinople. They are compared and looked at from a public theology’s point of view as outlined by Max Stackhouse. At the same time, in this article it will be emphasized the fact that the same Eastern Orthodox theological tradition is to be credited for two significantly different approaches on the topic at (...) hand. The recorded differences are to be interpreted in such a manner as to account for a possible paradigm shift in Orthodox ‘rights talk’. But this shift is more evident in contact with Western environment where the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition is just one of the religious and public voices in a pluralist, globalized and secularized society. (shrink)