Kuhn's mature philosophy of science and cognitive psychology

Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):347 – 363 (1996)
Drawing on the results of modem psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is not an insurmountable obstacle to accepting Kuhn's position, as many philosophers of science still believe. Rather it becomes a natural consequence of cognitive structures that appear in all human beings.
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Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen (2009). Rereading Kuhn. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):217 – 224.
Dragoş Bîgu (2013). A Similarity-Based Approach of Kuhn's No-Overlap Principle and Anomalies. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):330-338.
J. M. Kuukkanen (2009). Closing the Door to Cloud-Cuckoo Land: A Reply to Šešelja and Straßer. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):328-331.
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