The Possibility of Modified Hedonism

Theoria 78 (3):186-212 (2012)
Abstract
A popular objection to hedonist accounts of personal welfare has been the experience machine argument. Several modifications of traditional hedonism have been proposed in response. In this article I examine two such responses, recently expounded by Feldman and Sumner respectively. I argue that both modifications make hedonism indistinguishable from anti-hedonism. Sumner's account, I claim, also fails to satisfy the demands of theoretical unity
Keywords welfare  experience machine  pleasure  hedonism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,361
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Sandy Berkovski (2011). Prichard's Heresy. Philosophy 86 (04):503-524.
Ben Bradley (2002). Is Intrinsic Value Conditional? Philosophical Studies 107 (1):23 - 44.

View all 29 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Dale Dorsey (2011). The Hedonist's Dilemma. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):173-196.
Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
Joseph Mendola (2006). Intuitive Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):441 - 477.
Matthew Silverstein (2000). In Defense of Happiness. Social Theory and Practice 26 (2):279-300.
Dale Dorsey (2010). Hutcheson's Deceptive Hedonism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):445-467.
H. E. Baber (2008). The Experience Machine Deconstructed. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 15 (1):133-138.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-08-23

Total downloads

16 ( #103,952 of 1,102,698 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #24,541 of 1,102,698 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.