Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018)
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Abstract

Fallibilists claim that one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Jessica Brown offers a compelling defence of this view against infallibilists, who claim that it is contradictory to claim to know and yet to admit the possibility of error.

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Author's Profile

Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.
The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.
Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.
The New Evil Demon Problem at 40.Peter J. Graham - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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