23 found
Sort by:
  1. Diego E. Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.) (forthcoming). Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury.
  2. Baron Reed (2013). Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Baron Reed (2013). Historical Reflections: Sosa's Perspective on the Epistemological Tradition. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. 205--224.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Baron Reed (2013). Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 2--95.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Baron Reed (2012). Fallibilism. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Baron Reed (2012). Knowledge, Doubt, and Circularity. Synthese 188 (2):273-287.
    Ernest Sosa's virtue perspectivism can be thought of as an attempt to capture as much as possible of the Cartesian project in epistemology while remaining within the framework of externalist fallibilism. I argue (a) that Descartes's project was motivated by a desire for intellectual stability and (b) that his project does not suffer from epistemic circularity. By contrast, Sosa's epistemology does entail epistemic circularity and, for this reason, proves unable to secure the sort of intellectual stability Descartes wanted. I then (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Baron Reed (2012). Resisting Encroachment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):465-472.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Baron Reed (2010). A Defense of Stable Invariantism. Noûs 44 (2):224-244.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Baron Reed (2010). Self-Knowledge and Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):164-181.
    There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Baron Reed (2009). A New Argument for Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.
    The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Baron Reed, Certainty. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Baron Reed (2008). Fallibilism and the Lottery Paradox. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:217-225.
    Any theory of knowledge that is fallibilist—i.e., that allows for one to have knowledge that could have been false or accidentally true—faces the lottery paradox. The paradox arises from the combination of two plausible claims: first, no one can know that one’s lottery ticket will lose prior to learning that it in fact has lost, and, second, the justification one has for the belief that one’s ticket will lose is just as good as the justification one has for paradigmatic instances (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Baron Reed (2007). The Long Road to Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 104 (5):236-262.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Baron Reed (2006). Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism About Common Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):186–197.
    Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subject's doubts about her cognitive faculties. But, he argues, subjects (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Baron Reed (2006). Review of Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (4).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Baron Reed (2006). Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless. Synthese 148 (2):303 - 308.
    One of the main strands of the Cartesian tradition is the view that the mental realm is cognitively accessible to us in a special way: whenever one is in a mental state of a certain sort, one can know it just by considering the matter. In that sense, the mental realm is thought to be a cognitive home for us, and the mental states it comprises are luminous. Recently, however, Timothy Williamson has argued that we are cognitively homeless: no mental (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Baron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
    Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. The moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general factive mental (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Baron Reed (2005). The Price of Doubt. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):735-739.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Baron Reed (2002). How to Think About Fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.
    Almost every contemporary theory of knowledge is a version of fallibilism, yet an adequate statement of fallibilism has not yet been provided. Standard definitions cannot account for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. I consider and reject several attempts to resolve this difficulty before arguing that a belief is an instance of fallibilistic knowledge when it could have failed to be knowledge. This is a fully general account of fallibilism that applies to knowledge of necessary truths. Moreover, it reveals, not only (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Baron Reed (2002). The Stoics' Account of the Cognitive Impression. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 23:147-80.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Baron Reed (2001). Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):507-526.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Baron Reed (2000). Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):57-67.
    The Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 57-67.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation